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1. Overview  
This Emerging Issues report examines a number of popular narratives about the impacts of 
Chinese investment on economic development in Africa. Popular narratives include Chinese 
infrastructure investments have weak links to growth, Chinese investment leads to limited job 
creation in host countries, and Chinese development projects lead to environmental degradation 
(Bradsher, 2019).  
Chinese Development Finance 
China is not a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s 
(OECD’s) Development Assistance Committee (DAC). Its development financial flows to Africa 
do not align with OECD DAC definitions (Strange et al., 2013). OECD DAC defines official 
development assistance (ODA) as official financing whose main objective is economic 
development and welfare in developing countries, with a grant element of at least 25% (Dreher, 
Fuchs, Parks, Strange, & Tierney, 2017). AidData’s global dataset of Chinese development 
finance found that China provides very little aid in this strict sense globally, with the large 
proportion of Chinese development finance being categorised as other official flows (i.e. official 
finance that lacks development intent or a minimum level of concessionality) (Dreher et al., 
2017). As such, Chinese overseas financial flows are not directly comparable with DAC 
members’ flows to the developing world, and it can also be challenging trying to determine which 
investments or loans are development finance (Strange et al., 2013). China, along with Brazil 
and India, has also argued that “south-south” cooperation should not be held to the same 
standards as Western development aid (Strange et al., 2013).  
Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, Strange and Tierney’s (2015) study of Chinese state financing to Africa 
argues that foreign policy considerations (e.g. recipient countries’ UN General Assembly voting 
patterns and positions vis-à-vis the One China Policy) are the primary driver of Chinese 
development aid allocation, whilst economic interests are the primary driver behind less 
concessional and more commercially orientated state financing. Economic drivers of China’s less 
concessional financing include increasing exports and its own domestic development. As such, 
the motives behind Chinese official finance may not be substantially different from those shaping 
the allocation of Western finance (Dreher et al., 2015). Landry (2018a) argues that bilateral trade 
plays a statistically significant, positive role in predicting China’s development finance to Africa. 
China prioritises its commercial partners and the countries it is more politically aligned with when 
allocating development finance (Landry, 2018a).  
It is important to note that whilst Chinese overseas financial flows may have development 
impacts, not all flows are necessarily intended solely for development purposes. For example, 
“resources for infrastructure” loans involve the Chinese government offering loans for a package 
of multipurpose projects, including infrastructure, in order to facilitate access for its companies to 
a country’s natural resources sector (see for example, Li, Newenham-Kahindi, Shapiro, & Chen’s 
2013 case study of the extractives sector in Tanzania). Chinese official finance also supports 
infrastructure projects that benefit its companies operating in Africa. For example, in Tanzania, 
China is supporting improvements to the central Tanzania railway that will facilitate access for 
steel and iron products produced by one of its state-owned enterprises (SOEs) through Tanzania 
and into Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda (Li et al., 2013). Other Chinese financing instruments 
which can have development impacts include non-/ concessional loans, grants, Chinese state 
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involvement in foreign direct investment (FDI), preferential export buyer’s credits, natural 
resource backed loans, and lines of credit (Strange et al., 2013).  
According to Brautigam and Hwang (2016) the majority of finance from China to Africa originates 
from the policy banks, China Export Import Bank (Exim) and the China Development Bank. The 
Chinese foreign aid and development finance architecture includes (Strange et al., 2013; ERA, 
2009; Brautigam & Hwang, 2016): 
• The State Council: shapes China’s aid and investment strategy and determines the 
annual development assistance budget. 
• Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and its Department of Foreign Aid: oversees projects 
financed through zero-interest loans and grants and coordinates with China Export 
Import (Exim) Bank on concessional loans. 
• Policy banks: China Exim Bank and China Development Bank (CDB) provide 
concessional and non-concessional loans and export credits. It is common for 
concessional loans provided by the policy banks to carry a requirement for at least 50% 
procurement for infrastructure projects to be from China or Chinese companies and for a 
Chinese enterprise to be selected as the contractor. 
• Ministry of Finance: debt relief and contributions to multilateral institutions. 
• State-owned enterprises (SOEs): often the implementers of Chinese development 
investment and contractors on non-Chinese funded infrastructure projects. SOEs, with 
close ties to the national government, also account for 69% of Chinese foreign direct 
investment into Africa (Shinn, 2016)1. 
The range of actors involved in Chinese financial flows to the developing world also makes it 
challenging to examine the development impacts of Chinese investments. This report largely 
focuses on Chinese government-to-government funding, loans and concessional loans, the 
Chinese policy banks and SOEs. The role of small and medium private enterprises (SMEs) is 
largely outside the scope of this report but is included where relevant. For example, much has 
been written in the media about Chinese-owned mines in Zambia, including violence at the 
Collum Coal Mine. However, the controversial Collum Coal Mine is a privately-owned Chinese 
mine, not connected to a SOE or the Chinese government (Sautman & Hairong, 2014).  
Evidence Base 
The evidence base for this report is limited, which makes it difficult to draw firm 
conclusions. This report outlines dominant claims about the development impacts of Chinese 
finance to Africa in the media, grey literature and non-empirical academic literature, and 
assesses each claim against the available empirical evidence. It prioritises literature from 2010 
onwards to ensure that data and analysis are relevant to the dynamics and trends as they are 
playing out now. It draws on empirical evidence including case studies based on field research 
and interviews, and datasets from reliable sources. Where possible this report highlights 
 
1 The remaining 31% comes from private Chinese investment banks with government connections, sovereign 
funds like the China-Africa Development Fund, Chinese provincial and local governments, and small private 
companies and individual businesses (Shinn, 2016). 
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examples from Ethiopia, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The evidence is largely “gender-
blind.”  
Evidence on the impacts of Chinese investment is partially skewed towards anecdotal 
evidence (see for example, Wang and Zadek’s 2016 literature review for the International 
Institute for Sustainable Development). A common theme within the literature consulted for this 
review is the paucity of reliable data and the challenges this poses to understanding the China-
Africa relationship and measuring China’s development impact in Africa (Xu & Carey, 2015; 
Strange et al., 2013; Sun, Jayaram, & Kassiri, 2017). It is hard to ascertain a comprehensive 
picture, as the majority of studies focus on small samples or particular industries and countries 
(Sun et al., 2017). This also makes it difficult to extrapolate findings.  
This report largely focuses on empirical studies with a rigorous, replicable methodology and 
therefore draws on a very small evidence base, which means it is hard to draw robust findings in 
all the examined areas. The challenges posed by the opaqueness of Chinese financial flows (for 
example, the Chinese government releases few official statistics) means that both AidData and 
CARI (whose work this report draws on heavily) have used media-based data collection to 
produce databases of Chinese development assistance (see for example, Strange et al., 2013). 
This allows quantitative analysis but largely produces disaggregated results.  
2. Key findings 
It is important to disaggregate China. Chinese investments are not monolithic but made by a 
range of actors with different operating modalities and varying links to the Chinese government. 
For example, SOEs are regulated by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, which suggests the 
government and China Exim Bank may have more influence over them than privately-owned 
Chinese companies in Africa who do not have a parent company in China. Xiaoyang and Sun 
(2016) argue that the level of negative environmental impact of Chinese investment varies by 
industry and company attributes, including the size and relationship with the government.  
China is Africa’s largest construction financier and Chinese companies also win a large 
share of World Bank-financed infrastructure projects. Estimates vary but Sun et al. (2017) 
argue that Chinese companies claim nearly 50% of Africa’s internationally contracted 
construction market. Results from the 2016 Afrobarometer survey illustrate that Chinese financed 
and/or constructed infrastructure is African citizens’ most appreciated aspect of Chinese 
involvement in Africa (Lekorwe, Chingwete, Okuru, & Samson, 2016). 
When examining Chinese funded and/or constructed projects, it is important to distinguish 
between projects such as stadiums and government buildings versus transportation and energy 
infrastructure. The former are likely to be symbolic investments, which are not intended to be 
economically productive and are sometimes given as “gifts” to cement the relationship between 
two countries. Whilst no estimates could be found of the split between symbolic and productive 
investments during the course of this review, there are numerous media references to Chinese 
constructed public buildings (Dahir, 2018). 
Anecdotal evidence of the impact of Chinese investments is largely negative. However, 
the limited number of rigorous studies consulted for this review suggests a more nuanced 
picture. For example, Shen’s (2013) survey of government officials in five countries (Liberia, 
Ethiopia, Rwanda, Nigeria and Zambia) found that there was a perception that Chinese 
investment in labour intensive sectors led to job creation. However, perceptions of it facilitating 
4 
local industrialisation were only found in three countries (Ethiopia, Rwanda, Nigeria) (Shen, 
2013). This suggests that the impact of Chinese investment may vary by African country.  
There is also a lack of comparative studies, which makes it difficult to determine whether or not 
Chinese investment is qualitatively different to non-Chinese investment in certain sectors, such 
as extractives. Only an extremely small number of high-quality comparative studies were found 
during the course of this review. For example, Isaksson and Kotsadam’s (2018) study found a 
correlation between increasing Chinese aid and decreasing trade union involvement. Their 
comparison with the World Bank found that World Bank-funded projects do not affect trade union 
involvement.  
As alluded to above, the limited evidence base makes it difficult to draw robust findings. The 
findings from this report can be split into those for which there is a general consensus across a 
(small) sample of rigorous studies, and those for which more evidence is needed.  
General Findings  
Chinese investment supports national economic growth and is servicing Africa’s widely 
acknowledged infrastructure gap: a small body of rigorous evidence, largely derived from 
AidData datasets on Chinese investment in Africa, finds that Chinese investments have positive 
economic growth impacts including increases in GDP and flattening spatial inequalities.  
Chinese investment has mixed impact on local economic development: a small body of 
rigorous evidence suggests that Chinese investment increases infrastructure access at the local 
level and that there are positive economic spill overs, including increasing rural access to 
markets and higher wealth levels. However, there is a consensus that Chinese investment has 
weak backward linkages (related to the modalities of Chinese investment) and can act as 
“enclaves,” unintegrated with the host country’s economy. This can inhibit positive local 
economic development outcomes.  
Chinese investment does lead to job creation: there is consensus across the reviewed 
literature that Chinese investments and Chinese-owned companies lead to job creation, with 
estimates of local employment ranging from 75-92% of the workforce depending on the sector. 
However, there is also consensus that skilled positions are filled by Chinese workers. Skills 
training is a growing component of large Chinese funded/constructed infrastructure projects and 
within larger Chinese companies such as Huawei.  
Chinese-owned (both by SOEs and private companies) mines potentially have worse 
labour practices than their non-Chinese competitors: there is a relatively large body of 
evidence, particularly from Zambia, but also from Zimbabwe, outlining poor labour practices in 
the mines. Comparative studies are scant, but there is some evidence suggesting that these 
practices are worse than those at non-Chinese-owned mines.  
Chinese development investments in hydropower, infrastructure construction and 
extractives have resulted in instances of environmental degradation. There are examples of 
inadequate environmental impact assessments, water and soil pollution and illegal activities. 
Chinese development investments and private investment activities have been linked to 
deforestation and illegal logging. It is important to note that investments in hydropower and 
extractives are often controversial regardless of the donor, due to issues related to environmental 
degradation and resettlement.  
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Mounting criticism of the environmental impacts of Chinese investments in Africa has 
resulted in the Chinese Government and Chinese policy banks issuing new voluntary 
guidelines to improve standards. However, the literature suggests that the Chinese 
government, the China Exim Bank and the China Development Bank have more influence over 
SOEs than the SMEs operating in Africa, particularly those that do not have a parent company in 
China. These guidelines are also voluntary, and it is assumed that Chinese companies will abide 
by host country laws. This is problematic as host countries do not always have or enforce strong 
environmental and social standards for investment projects.  
Across the literature, a common theme is the role of African government agency in 
Chinese investments. Studies of forest loss cover in Tanzania and mines in Zambia suggest 
that host government agency can condition whether outcomes of Chinese investment are 
negative or positive. Enforcement of host country regulations and policies can constrain negative 
outcomes – however, in a number of African countries the regulatory and enforcement 
environment is weak (see for example, Shinn’s 2016 study of Chinese environmental impacts in 
Africa). Related to this is the claim that African governments prefer Chinese investments as the 
absence of aid conditionalities and lower social and environmental safeguards means projects 
can be implemented quicker (BenYishay, Parks, Runfola, & Trichler, 2016). There is a 
suggestion in the literature that this could encourage African countries to “shop” their riskiest 
projects to China in order to ensure they are funded (BenYishay et al., 2016). 
More Evidence Needed  
Chinese constructed infrastructure is widely believed to be low quality, however, only two 
studies testing this assertion were found during the course of this review. This is a very 
limited evidence base and one of the studies does not necessarily test the assertion in a useful 
manner for the purposes of this report. Hence it is not possible to draw a finding.  
Chinese investments in transportation and energy infrastructure are likely to be 
productive investments but it is too early to say definitively that this is the case. 
Transportation projects have the potential to contribute to economic growth and dovetail with 
both the Belt and Road Initiative and host government and regional organisations, such as the 
East African Community’s plans for transport corridors which will increase trade and lead to 
economic growth. China Exim Bank loans are largely directed at productive investments: 
between 2000 and 2015, 44% of loans were for the transport sector, 29% for energy and mining, 
5% for water and sanitation, 5% for communications and 17% for other sectors (Eom et al., 
2017). High profile infrastructure projects, such as the standard gauge railways (SGR) between 
Mombasa-Nairobi and Addis Ababa-Djibouti have been subject to a number of criticisms 
including corruption and poor job creation. However, as they are only just coming online it is hard 
to judge their economic productivity definitively.  
6 
3. Economic growth impacts  
Chinese Development Investments and National Economic Growth2 
The Chinese government conceptualises its investment in Africa as “win-win,” leading to growth 
in both China and Africa. At the 2018 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), China’s 
President Xi Jinping argued that the goal of China-Africa relations is to make “lives better for our 
people” and as such, cooperation should deliver real benefits to both China and Africa (Tiezzi, 
2018). However, the link between Chinese investment and economic growth is widely debated 
and particular areas of engagement, such as natural resource backed loans, have been widely 
criticised (Strange et al., 2013; Alves, 2013). For example, Alves (2013) argues that whilst 
resource for infrastructure deals have increased access to hard infrastructure such as roads, 
dams and railways, they have done relatively little for Africa’s economic diversification and 
helping the continent shift away from resource dependency and towards resource-based 
industrialisation.  
In contrast, a second body of work links Chinese investment, particularly in infrastructure, with 
national economic growth, defined in terms of GDP and per capita income. Africa has a widely 
acknowledged infrastructure gap and infrastructure investments are seen as key to ease 
constraints to economic growth and to spur growth acceleration (Dollar, 2016; Dreher et al., 
2017; Wang & Zadek, 2016). Renwick, Gu and Gong’s (2018) literature review argues that there 
is evidence from Kenya and Ethiopia that China’s infrastructure is adding to the production 
capacity of these countries. Schoneveld, German and Gumbo’s (2014) empirical case study of 
Zambia argues that Chinese involvement in the mining sector has contributed to Zambia’s 
economic recovery and Chinese development finance has resulted in upgraded infrastructure.  
What Does the Evidence Tell Us? 
A good-sized body of work addresses China’s impact on economic growth. However, a large 
proportion of this work draws on secondary sources: only a small number of sources are based 
on empirical data. For example, the RAND Corporation’s 2014 report on Chinese Engagement in 
Africa references a 2010 study by the World Bank that claims infrastructure has been responsible 
for more than half of Africa’s recent improved growth performance (Hanauer & Morris, 2014). 
Hanauer and Morris (2014) extrapolate that as Chinese investments represent about one-eighth 
of external support to Africa, China has been a significant driver of Africa’s growth.  
This review identified five studies with clear methodologies that analyse empirical data. These 
studies show a generally positive impact on economic growth measures and consider Chinese 
aid, concessionary and non-concessionary loans and FDI. However, there are limitations to this 
small evidence base. 
Chinese Foreign Direct Investment 
Weisbrod and Whalley (2011) argue that for the period 2005-2009, Chinese foreign direct 
investment (including FDI backed by the Chinese government through companies’ access to low-
cost credit) contributed up to a 0.5% point per year increase to individual sub-Saharan countries’ 
 
2 Issues concerning debt sustainability are considered in the second report in this two-part series.  
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GDP growth. The authors analysed 13 countries including Ethiopia, Tanzania and Zambia. For 
example, in Zambia for 2006-2008, Chinese investment elevated GDP growth by 0.44%-0.67% 
per annum. However, it is important to note that copper prices were high during this period, so 
the effect may not be the same after 2010 and the end of the commodities boom. Chinese 
investment during the study period expanded from having significant growth effects in a relatively 
small group of core countries (Nigeria, Niger, Sudan, Zambia, and to a lesser extent DRC) in the 
years preceding the global financial crisis, to having noticeable, if smaller, growth effects in a 
wider range of sub-Saharan countries during the years of the crisis (2008-2009). The results 
suggest a significant, albeit in some cases small, amount of elevated growth in sub-Saharan 
Africa can be attributed to Chinese investment.  
Donou-Adonsou and Lim (2018) argue that Chinese foreign direct investment (including through 
or facilitated by the Chinese government established China-Africa Development Fund) has a 
positive effect on the standard of living defined in terms of per capita income. The authors 
analyse 36 sub-Saharan countries for the period 2003-2012 and find that a 1% rise in Chinese 
FDI raises per capita income by 0.029%. However, the study also finds that a 1% rise in US FDI 
raises per capita income by 0.089%. The authors argue their study fills a gap, as the link 
between Chinese FDI and the income of African countries has not really been studied.  
Chinese Aid  
Dreher et al.’s (2017) study into the extent Chinese aid (including aid, concessional and non-
concessional state financing) affects economic growth in recipient countries argues that Chinese 
aid boosts economic growth. For the average recipient country, Dreher et al. (2017, p. i) estimate 
that “one additional Chinese ODA project produces a 0.7 percentage point increase in economic 
growth two years after the project is committed.” This effect is sizable in relation to the fact that 
the average economic growth rate of recipient countries is 2.8% points. However, the study was 
based on AidData’s global dataset Global Chinese Development Finance, which includes 138 
countries for the period 2000 and 20143. The data in the study is presented in aggregate form 
and not per region, so contributions to African growth, as opposed to results for the average 
country, are not presented.  
In terms of sub-national growth, there is some evidence that Chinese investment contributes to 
sub-national growth and flattens spatial inequalities within and between regions in a country. 
Dreher et al.’s (2016) investigation into whether more Chinese aid (including aid, concessional 
and non-concessional forms of state financing) is allocated to African leaders’ birth regions, also 
examines the impact of Chinese aid on regional development. The study uses AidData’s Chinese 
Official Finance to Africa dataset4 and per capita night-time light emissions as a measure of 
subnational economic activity. Results show that a 10% increase in Chinese aid increases 
regional GDP by approximately 0.24%. Chinese funding has an immediate, positive effect on per 
 
3 This a new dataset of official financing (foreign aid, concessional and non-concessional state financing) 
constructed using a publicly available method called Tracking Underreported Financial Flows to collect 
comprehensive financial, operational and locational information about Chinese government-financed projects 
over the 2000-2014 period. This method triangulates data from four types of open sources – news reports 
(English, Chinese and local-language); official statements from Chinese ministries, embassies and economic and 
commercial counsellor offices; the aid and debt information management systems of finance and planning 
ministers in counterpart countries; and, case study and field research undertaken by scholars and NGOs (Bluhm 
et al., 2018). 
4 The dataset contains 1,650 projects committed to 49 countries for 2000-2012 during writing of this article.  
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capita night-time light output at ADM2 level (for example, district/municipality), with the 
magnitude of the effect increasing over time. At the ADM1 level (for example, province/state), a 
similar effect occurs, but with a three-year delay.  
Measuring local economic activity using official data is extremely difficult (Bluhm et al., 2018). 
Night-time light intensity is increasingly being used by researchers and academics as a proxy for 
local economic activity, as studies show changes in light emissions correlate strongly with 
traditional measures of welfare down to the village level (Bluhm et al., 2018). However, there are 
some reservations in the academic literature about how reliable this is as measure of economic 
activity at the subnational level (see for example, Mellander, Lobo, Stolarick, & Matheson, 2015). 
The results of Bluhm et al.’s (2018) working paper suggest that Chinese government-financed 
infrastructure projects in general, and transportation projects in particular, reduce economic 
inequality within and between subnational localities. Infrastructure projects produce positive 
economic spill-overs that flatten the spatial distribution of economic activity by dispersing it 
outside of a small number of economic centres. This study is also based on data from AidData 
for 138 countries between 2000 and 2014: within this dataset, projects are densely concentrated 
in Africa and Asia. However, results are presented in aggregate form for the average country and 
there is no breakdown by region or country, which makes it hard to determine the results on 
Africa specifically.  
What Can We Conclude?  
The results of the studies discussed above suggest that Chinese investment positively 
contributes to national economic growth and can also contribute to flattening spatial 
inequalities. However, it is not possible to draw firm conclusions on the basis of five studies, 
particularly when results within this small evidence base are largely produced at the aggregate 
level, which could mask variations between countries.  
Chinese Investments and the Local Economy  
A small body of literature examines the impacts of Chinese investment on the local economy. 
Popular claims within media and secondary sources include that Chinese investments do not 
create backwards linkages to the local economy, depend on procurement from China, do not 
create local jobs, and can act as “enclaves” without positive spill-over benefits such as communal 
welfare benefits (see for example, Wegenast, Struver, Giesen, & Krauser, 2017; Gardner, 2018; 
Alves, 2013). Schoneveld et al.’s (2014) case study of Zambia argues that Chinese companies 
tend to agglomerate, servicing each other both horizontally and vertically creating enclaves with 
few linkages to the domestic economy.  
However, when examining these claims it is important to disaggregate China, as different actors 
and different types of financing have different types of modalities, affecting whether or not 
linkages can be created with the local economy. For example, concessional foreign aid loans 
provided by China Exim Bank operate as government to government development finance for 
projects that generate economic or social benefits, including infrastructure projects and imports 
of essential equipment and machinery (Brautigam & Hwang, 2016, p. 24). These loans can 
require at least 50% of the goods and services procured under the loan to come from China 
(Brautigam & Hwang, 2016). Wissenbach and Wang (2017) argue that the controversy over 
Chinese procurement is linked to a misconception that Chinese financing in developing countries 
is the same as development aid. Similarly to other export-import banks, the goal of China Exim 
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Bank is to provide access to credit for buyers of a nation’s goods. The majority of official Chinese 
investment goes through the China Exim Bank. Brautigam and Hwang (2016) argue that China 
has provided USD 86.3 billion in loans to African governments and SOEs between 2000 and 
2014, with USD 59 billion provided by China Exim Bank and USD 13.7 billion by China 
Development Bank. During this period, the Chinese government provided USD 3.5 billion in zero-
interest loans and approximately USD 2.65 billion in grants (Brautigam & Hwang, 2016). Grants 
and zero-interest loans often have a condition attached that the majority, if not all, procurement is 
sourced from a list of approved Chinese firms (Freeman & Boynton, 2011).  
What Does the Evidence Tell Us? 
Backwards Linkages and Procurement 
Case studies of particular infrastructure projects, for example the Benguela Railway in Angola 
(Duarte, Pacheco, Santos, & Tjonneland, 2015), illustrate that procurement in Chinese-funded 
and constructed infrastructure projects is largely from China. Resource for infrastructure loans 
deals also link infrastructure construction with Chinese companies and procurement from China. 
For example, dam building in the Republic of Congo and the construction of a power plant in 
Sudan were financed in return for prospective oil production, with loans channelled through 
Chinese banks and the work carried out exclusively by Chinese construction firms (Wegenast et 
al., 2017). However, this is to be expected considering the modalities of non-concessional and 
concessional loans provided by the Chinese policy banks and grants from the Chinese 
governments.  
A 2017 McKinsey & Company report found that procurement by 1,000 Chinese companies in 
eight sub-Saharan countries is low, with only 47% of procurement by value being locally sourced 
(Sun et al., 2017). Sun et al. (2017) estimate that 90% of these companies are privately owned, 
disputing the idea of a monolithic China Inc. operating in Africa. Wang and Zadek’s (2016) 
literature review identifies a number of empirical studies that provide potential explanations for 
low levels of backward linkages by Chinese companies. These include the absence of local 
networks of specialised suppliers or, where they do exist, the low quality and high costs means 
firms turn to suppliers in China; higher transaction costs when dealing with local suppliers due to 
cultural and language distance; and lower capacity and skill levels of host country suppliers 
(Wang & Zadek, 2016). For example, Kim and Tukic (2018) argue that whilst Tanzania is 
strengthening local procurement regulations, external partners are frustrated with the poor quality 
of the supply chain network, including chronic shortages and high prices of materials (e.g. 
cement) which can clog up the supply chain flow and cause project delays. 
Household Welfare 
Martorano, Metzger and Sanfilippo (2018) investigate the impact of Chinese aid (including state-
financed concessional and non-concessional loans) at the household welfare level (measured in 
terms of wealth and education status) in 13 sub-Saharan African countries, including Ethiopia 
and Zimbabwe5. The authors matched geocoded data on Chinese projects (including transport, 
energy, education and health projects, amongst others) from AidData’s Chinese Official Finance 
 
5 Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Malawi, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Togo, Uganda and 
Zimbabwe.  
10 
to Africa6 with geocoded household data from Demographic and Health Surveys at two points in 
time (before and after the inflow of Chinese aid) to assess the impacts on households that live in 
proximity to a project.  
The study found that households in proximity to Chinese projects are more likely to be wealthier 
and in a higher wealth quintile, stay in school longer and achieve a higher educational attainment 
than households that are not in proximity to a Chinese project. Sectoral analysis of the data 
found that economic projects generate broader benefits than social sector projects. The authors 
are hesitant to apply causality to the link between proximity to a Chinese project and being 
wealthier because wealth indicators for the majority of the sample countries are only available for 
the latest round of the Demographic Health Survey (post-Chinese aid). Education data is 
available for both before and after.  
Case Study Evidence 
Kragelund and Carmody’s (2016) case study of the impacts of Chinese, Indian and South African 
companies on local economic development in Zambia is based on fieldwork conducted between 
2012 and 2015. Findings include a relative lack of linkages and spill-over to the local economy. 
Chinese, Indian and South African investment has not led to structural transformation of the 
economy. They argue the Zambian economy has become less diversified, as the huge influx of 
commodity-related investments have no or few linkages to locally owned companies. 
Consequently, few spill-overs have occurred, which makes it hard to build local technological 
capabilities: this works against structural transformation rather than promoting it. The authors 
also suggest that the way Chinese companies interact with locally owned firms largely mirrors the 
interactions of actors from the global North. However, it was not possible during the timeframe of 
this review to compare similarities and differences in how Chinese companies and their 
counterparts interact with local companies.  
Duarte et al.’s (2015) study of the Benguela Railway, Angola, identifies a number of positive 
economic spill-over effects, including reaching under-served rural communities, facilitating the 
reestablishment of commercial links between rural and urban centres, as well as increasing the 
number of small-scale trade centres in rural areas along the railway and providing informal 
employment for motorbike taxis.  
What Can We Conclude?  
The impacts of Chinese investments on local economic development are mixed and it is 
not possible to draw a robust conclusion due to the limited evidence base. There is a 
general consensus that procurement from local suppliers and companies is low, which limits the 
depth and breadth of backward linkages. However, this relates to the operational modalities of 
the Chinese policy banks. There is some evidence that living in proximity to a Chinese aid project 
in sub-Saharan Africa has a positive impact on household welfare and that the Benguela Railway 
has had positive local economic spill-over effects.  
 
6 This dataset contains 1,955 geocoded projects in 50 African countries, spanning 3,545 locations and covering 
the years 2000 to 2012. 
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4. Productiveness of Infrastructure Projects 
China is criticised for financing politically motivated and economically unsustainable projects 
(Bluhm et al., 2018). For example, literature from the period 2007 to 2012, surveyed by Strange 
et al. (2013), argues that China funds the construction of hospitals but does not provide staff or 
equipment, undermining their long-term sustainability, and that China funds highly visible projects 
such as stadiums that offer limited or transitory economic benefits.  
The counter argument is that Africa’s infrastructure gap constrains growth and China is filling a 
gap in infrastructure funding, as traditional bilateral donors are largely absent from this sector 
(Alves, 2013; Strange et al., 2013; Dollar, 2016; Renwick et al., 2018; d’Orey & Prizzon, 2017). 
High-quality infrastructure is critical for Africa to achieve the SDGs, the African Union’s Agenda 
2063 and the African Development Bank’s High Five Goals (Renwick et al., 2018). Africa’s 
infrastructure indicators are low, with electricity, transportation and communications capacity 
amongst the lowest in the world and particularly acute needs in sub-Saharan Africa (Alves, 2013; 
Renwick et al., 2018). In 2018, the African Development Bank estimated Africa’s infrastructure 
need was USD 130-170 billion a year, with a current deficit of USD 68-108 billion a year (Renwik 
et al., 2018).  
China is Africa’s largest construction financier and it has supported many of Africa’s most 
ambitious infrastructure developments in recent years (Sun et al., 2017). Chinese firms claim 
nearly 50% of Africa’s internationally contracted construction market (Sun et al., 2017). Strange 
et al. (2013) argue that China provides demand-driven assistance that delivers tangible results in 
a relatively short period of time. Results from the 2016 Afrobarometer survey show that 
infrastructure is African citizens’ most appreciated aspect of Chinese involvement in Africa 
(Lekorwe et al., 2016). 
There is also a regional dimension to China’s infrastructure investment and links to its Belt and 
Road Initiative (Renwick et al., 2018). For example, the new Mombasa-Nairobi standard gauge 
railway is part of Belt and Road (Wissenbach & Wang, 2017). China and the African Union 
signed a MOU in January 2015 to strengthen cooperation in infrastructure, particularly in regional 
connective infrastructure such as cross-border railways and roads to promote integration 
between countries (Renwick et al., 2018).  
The Quality and Functionality of Chinese Infrastructure Projects 
There is a wealth of anecdotal evidence that Chinese-constructed and/or funded infrastructure is 
low quality7. The most prominent examples include infrastructure that is non-functioning or 
suffers from severe problems. These include a bridge that collapsed in Kenya in 2017 (Duggan, 
2017), claims of “shoddy work” on power stations in Botswana (Ndlovu, 2014), a Chinese built 
hospital in Angola that closed due to cracks (Redvers, 2010), “shoddy construction” of two dams 
in Uganda (Matsiko, 2016), and poorly constructed roads in Ethiopia and Zambia (Balambaras, 
2014). In the case of the bridge collapse in Kenya, the political opposition leader Raila Odinga 
publicly blamed the government, arguing that they rushed the project for political purposes 
(Duggan, 2017). Evidence-based assessments of these construction projects could not be found 
during the course of this review. Therefore, it is not possible to substantiate whether low quality 
 
7 See for example, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/china-infrastructure-
africa_us_57b32e3ae4b0863b0284d2b3?guccounter=1 
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projects are the result of a lack of Chinese company compliance with standards, whether the 
infrastructure has been designed to a low specification, or if there has been a lack of monitoring 
from host governments.  
Academic and grey literature also cities concerns over quality (see for example, Alves, 2013; 
Wang & Zadek, 2016). Landry (2018b) argues that resource for infrastructure deals can be prone 
to quality problems and there is an assumption that they are not held to the same quality controls 
as projects funded through traditional modes of financing. However, few concerns regarding 
quality can be substantiated (Landry, 2018b).  
What Does the Evidence Tell Us?  
During the course of this report, only two empirical studies were located that focused on the 
quality of projects constructed by Chinese companies. Benazeraf’s (2014) case study of Chinese 
constructed roads and housing in Nairobi supports the low-quality narrative. Based on 
observations and interviews in Nairobi in 2012, Benazeraf (2014) highlights criticisms of the new 
Nairobi-Thika Highway, including engineering defects, incompatibility with local standards, and 
poor attention to detail due to the speed at which the project was implemented. Benazeraf (2014) 
concludes that it is too early to measure how well the project will stand the test of time and the 
lower initial costs from contracting Chinese companies could turn out to be higher over the long-
term.  
Chinese companies have developed a strong track record of winning World Bank-financed 
projects in Africa. These projects are often open tender, involving a competitive process with the 
lowest price conforming bid winning the contract. Between 2007 and 2015, Chinese contractors 
won one-third of World Bank funded infrastructure contracts across Africa (Farrell, 2016). In 
2013, China won 17% of World Bank-financed civil works contracts in sub-Saharan Africa by 
number, and 42% by value (Gutman & Zhang, 2015). This suggests that Chinese companies 
may have lower costs than other companies.  
Farrell (2016) tests the assertion that Chinese transportation infrastructure is of low quality by 
comparing World Bank-funded projects constructed by Chinese companies with those 
constructed by OECD country firms. The study found no statistically significant difference in 
quality of work between Chinese firms and OECD firms on World Bank transportation contracts 
won between 2000 and 2007 and completed by 2013 (Farrell, 2016). However, it is important to 
remember that as World Bank-financed projects, the winning contractor would have to comply 
with World Bank standards. Therefore, the conclusions from Farrell’s (2016) study illustrate that 
Chinese contractors comply with World Bank standards when working on World Bank projects. 
No comparisons could be found during the course of this review of the quality of Chinese-funded 
and implemented projects in Africa compared to projects financed by the World Bank or other 
actors in Africa.  
Several media reports and some grey literature (including the 2017 McKinsey & Company report) 
state that claims of poor-quality infrastructure are a misperception (see for example, a 2016 
article by the China Africa Project8). However, these sources all draw on Farrell’s (2016) working 
paper from the China Africa Research Initiative at John Hopkins University. The McKinsey & 
 
8 The China Africa Project is part of the non-profit US Asia Society’s Centre for US-China Relations founded by 
the Rockefeller family in the 1950s. The article can be accessed here: http://www.chinafile.com/china-africa-
project/chinas-undeserved-reputation-building-bad-infrastructure-africa  
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Company report does supplement Farrell’s conclusions with findings from qualitative interviews 
with African government officials, suggesting that China’s contribution to infrastructure includes 
speedy delivery without compromising on quality (Sun et al., 2017). Moreover, one African 
government official stated that Chinese bids for contracts were routinely 40% cheaper than the 
next lowest bid for similar levels of quality (Sun et al., 2017). However, this claim could not be 
substantiated during the course of this review.  
What Can We Conclude? 
It is not possible to draw a finding about the quality of Chinese infrastructure projects on the 
basis of two academic studies and anecdotal evidence.  
The Economic Viability of Chinese Infrastructure Projects  
The economic viability of a number of Chinese-funded infrastructure projects, including the 
Djibouti-Addis Ababa railway and the Mombasa-Nairobi railway, have been widely questioned910. 
For example, the chief economist at Sinosure, the Chinese-state owned insurer, publicly stated 
they have been forced to write off USD 1 billion in losses on the Djibouti-Addis Ababa railway 
and that the project’s due diligence has been “inadequate.”11 Some media reports have labelled 
large projects “vanity projects”(Pilling & Feng, 2018). At the 2018 Forum on China Africa 
Cooperation, China’s President Xi Jinping stated that vanity projects must be shunned in favour 
of more carefully assessed initiatives that address proven bottlenecks (Pilling & Feng, 2018).  
The following sub-sections largely focus on transportation projects because, along with energy 
investments, this has been the focus of 60% of Chinese infrastructure investment in Africa. 
However, Chinese investments have also supported a number of building projects, such as a 
new library in Dar es Salaam, as well as plans for new or extended airports in Tanzania, Sierra 
Leone and Zimbabwe. Airports are a potentially controversial area of support as they involve 
resettlement and land compensation. In 2018, Sierra Leone cancelled a Chinese loan deal to 
build a new international airport at Mamamah, citing concerns that the project is uneconomical 
considering the existing international airport is under-utilised (Kazeem, 2018).  
What Does the Evidence Tell Us?  
There is a relatively good-sized body of working papers and policy briefs examining large-scale 
Chinese funded and /or constructed infrastructure projects in Africa. These include transportation 
projects, mines and dams. References to “white elephant” projects can be found in a number of 
peer-reviewed and academic sources, for example, the new Ministry of Foreign Affairs building in 
Dar es Salaam (Kim & Tukic, 2018). The literature is skewed towards case studies, which means 
there are few comparative studies. The evidence base is fairly recent and as such, the focus is 
often on outlining the project or researching project details. Working papers and policy briefs 
present a more nuanced view than the media narrative, arguing that a number of factors 
 
9 https://www.ft.com/content/82e77d8a-e716-11e8-8a85-04b8afea6ea3  
10 In the case of the Kenya Standard Gauge Railway, there are also questions of duplication as at times the 
railway runs alongside the existing Rift Valley Railway, which is currently the subject of OECD country funding 
(d’Orey & Prizzon, 2017).  
11 https://www.ft.com/content/82e77d8a-e716-11e8-8a85-04b8afea6ea3  
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determine economic viability of individual projects, including risk management and the host 
governments’ policy making processes.  
Bräutigam (2018), a leading China expert, argues that a database of Chinese loans to Africa 
since 2000, compiled by John Hopkins University and Boston University, shows that the majority 
of Chinese loans are performing a useful service financing Africa’s infrastructure gap. There have 
been some “dud” projects, but overall Chinese loans have comparatively low interest rates, long 
repayment periods and will boost economic growth (Bräutigam, 2018). However, a lack of 
transparency and data can make it hard to assess the return on investment and economic 
viability of individual projects (see for example, Duarte et al., 2015). A number of transportation 
projects have cross-border elements or are part of planned regional transport corridors, so as 
such the productiveness of individual projects is connected to the realisation of wider plans and 
benefits may take some time to become apparent or accrue.  
The Mombasa-Nairobi Railway 
This is a flagship infrastructure project, which has been subject to domestic criticism as well as 
concerns about whether the next stage of the project will be completed, as press reports suggest 
China Exim Bank has cut its funding (Renwick et al., 2018). Part of the Belt and Road Initiative, 
the standard gauge railway (SGR) is part of a planned/under construction rail network 
funded/constructed by China, which runs on the standard gauge system, meaning that other 
railways that want to connect with it will have to operate on standard gauge also (Wissenbach & 
Wang, 2017; d’Orey & Prizzon, 2017). Built by China Roads and Bridges, its parent company, 
China Communications Construction Company has been awarded the contract to run the railway 
for the first five years of operation (despite being on the World Bank’s debarred list) (Wissenbach 
& Wang, 2017). 
In 2017, the Government of China outlined a number of benefits to the new SGR, including 
anticipated 1.5% GDP growth, shorter freight transfers, 46,000 jobs and linkages to the local 
economy including sub-contracting to Kenyan firms, technology transfers, and skills development 
through a new railway engineering academy (Renwick et al., 2018). A number of these benefits 
are disputed, and the SGR has been subject to a number of claims commonly levelled at 
Chinese projects: questions around its economic viability, corruption, opaque contracting 
practices, financing arrangement, and community and labour issues (Wissenbach & Wang, 
2017). There are claims within the media that Kenya has overpaid for the railway (Solomon, 
2018b). 
Wissenbach and Wang’s (2017) CARI working paper argues that problems with the project are 
partially due to Kenya’s neo-patrimonial culture and governance issues at the national and local 
levels, as opposed to its status as a Chinese project. Based on fieldwork during the construction 
phase, the working paper is the first detailed case study of a strategic government-contracted 
Chinese infrastructure project in Kenya and argues that the railway faces similar implementation 
problems to many other large infrastructure projects.  
The SGR’s economic viability is linked to the project’s regional dimension: it is part of the 
planned regional Northern Corridor Initiative aimed at linking Mombasa Port with Uganda and 
Rwanda (Wissenbach & Wang, 2017). It will also need to be competitive with road transport 
(Wissenbach & Wang, 2017). As of 2017, the majority of freight from the Port of Mombasa 
destined for Rwanda, DRC and others is transported by road, and only 0.9 million tonnes 
(against a throughput of 22 million tonnes) is transported on the old colonial Rift Valley Railway 
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(Wissenbach & Wang, 2017). The SGR, built alongside the Rift Valley Railway, but without the 
bends, aims to increase throughput by rail and reduce costs and time by up to 60% (Wissenbach 
& Wang, 2017). There are some concerns about duplication, as the Rift Valley Railway is 
currently being renovated by other donors (Wissenbach & Wang, 2017). The SGR may increase 
the costs of doing business in Kenya in the short-term: to fund the railway, Kenya increased a 
number of levies and taxes, including the port traffic tax.  
Wissenbach and Wang (2017) argue that Chinese investors aligned themselves with Kenya’s 
development priorities as defined by the President. They argue that there is a need to 
understand African agency in Chinese financed and constructed infrastructure projects: African 
agency is critical to making infrastructure projects work for inclusive development and profitable 
economic growth.  
Ethiopia  
China is the main financier of the energy and railway sectors and a major financier in the road 
sector: its engagement is largely quasi-commercial, based on loans from the China Exim Bank 
(d’Orey & Prizzon, 2017). China is currently involved in a number of infrastructure projects 
including the Addis Ababa Urban Rail project (the first light railway in Africa), the Gibe II 
hydropower project and the Addis Ababa International Convention and Exhibition Centre 
(Renwick et al., 2018). Loans from China’s Exim Bank for infrastructure projects have often been 
secured and repaid out of Ethiopia’s exports and Chinese companies have been awarded the 
contracts in return for the Ethiopian government receiving funding (Renwick et al., 2018).  
The Djibouti-Addis Ababa Railway is expected to reduce freight transport times from three days 
by road to 12 hours by train and cut transport costs by one-third (Golubski, 2017). Each train will 
be able to carry freight equivalent to 220 trucks (Golubski, 2017). The railway is part of Ethiopia’s 
plan to achieve middle-income country status as it links the landlocked country to the sea and 
lowers transport costs for imports/exports, which will help to “kick-start” industrialisation 
(Gardner, 2018). Criticisms of the project include poor land compensation mechanisms and 
limited job creation, with low wages and bad treatment (Gardner, 2018). During the course of this 
review no rigorous assessment of the viability of the project was found.  
Tanzania  
Kim and Tukic’s (2018) policy briefing on China’s role in Tanzania’s Bagamoyo port development 
argues that the success of projects depends on the proper management of risks, uncertainties 
and the complexity of the policy making process by the host government, rather than Chinese 
contractors or finance institutions. In addition to developing a new port at Bagamoyo with China 
Merchants Holding International and an Omani sovereign wealth fund, Tanzania also signed a 
deal in 2017 with China Harbour Engineering Corporation to expand the port of Dar es Salaam 
(Kim & Tukic, 2018). The World Bank estimate inefficiencies at Dar es Salaam port are costing 
Tanzania and its neighbouring countries up to USD 2.6 billion a year (Kin & Tukic, 2018).  
Development of both ports has raised questions about duplication and competition between the 
two ports, and also with Kenya’s upgraded Mombasa Port and plans for the Lamu Port-South 
Sudan-Ethiopia transport corridor (LAPSSET): Tanzania and Kenya are competing to be East 
Africa’s regional transport hub (Kim & Tukic, 2018). Lack of coordination between stakeholders 
has been identified as a problem by DFID and UNDP, as Tanzania supports a number of 
transnational corridor projects (Kim & Tukic, 2018). Bagamoyo port has also been identified as a 
potential legacy project as it is the former President’s hometown (Kim & Tukic, 2018).  
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China is also heavily involved in the railways sector in Tanzania, with plans to revitalise the 
Tanzania-Zambia railway (originally funded by China in 1970s) and build new SGRs connecting 
Dar es Salaam and the port of Dar es Salaam with cities in central and western Tanzania and 
Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi (Tukic, 2015). A Chinese company is also building a new line 
linking the Chinese-developed mines in southern Tanzania to the port of Mtwara to facilitate 
exports (Tukic, 2015).  
What Can We Conclude?  
The projects reviewed in this section all have the potential to contribute to economic 
growth and address Africa’s infrastructure gap. However, the regional dimension and 
their recent completion mean it is too soon to draw conclusions on their economic 
productivity. China’s involvement in East Africa’s railways is part of its support for planned East 
African transport corridors. Tukic (2015) argues that these developments have significant 
implications for East Africa in terms of intra-regional trade and travel as well as competition, 
which has the potential to speed up economic growth. However, there are also questions of 
duplication and claims that some high-profile projects, such as Bagamoyo Port, are legacy 
projects.  
The productivity of infrastructure investments may also be conditioned by the policy, 
regulation and governance environment of the host country. Whilst some of the examined 
projects are part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, they are also projects that have been 
identified by the host country or by regional associations such as the East African Community, so 
they are also demand-driven. For example, Wissenbach and Wang (2017) argue that China and 
Chinese investors have aligned themselves with Kenya’s development priorities as defined by 
the Kenyan President. They argue that there is a need to understand African agency in Chinese 
financed and constructed infrastructure projects, as African agency is critical to making 
infrastructure projects work for inclusive development and profitable economic growth.  
5. Labour Issues 
Labour issues, including the perception that Chinese-funded projects use Chinese labour as 
opposed to local labour, is one of the areas that has received the most media and grey literature 
attention (Soule, 2019; Solomon, 2018a). Narratives centre on low wages, poor working 
conditions, environmental degradation, lack of technological transfer, and low-level skill 
development (Leslie, 2016).  
Chinese Investments and Local Employment 
Employment effects of Chinese resource extraction companies operating in developing countries 
are often reported to be non-existent as they bring in their own workforce, rather than hiring 
locally (Wegenast et al., 2017). Explanations for this include large rural unemployment in China 
and cultural and language barriers which inhibit hiring host country labour (Wegenast et al., 
2017; Alves, 2013). A 2017 Pew Research Centre study of perceptions of China found that 
Kenya and Ghana had significantly lower opinions of China than in 2015 (China Power Team, 
2016). The China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies suggest 
that this could be partly due to the lack of employment opportunities for local workers created by 
Chinese investments (China Power Team, 2016).  
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What Does the Evidence Tell Us?  
Employment creation: Surveys and official statistics demonstrate that Chinese 
funded/constructed projects, Chinese-owned resource extraction projects, and Chinese 
companies lead to local employment. These include:  
• Sun et al. (2017): 89% of workers in 1,073 Chinese-owned companies surveyed were 
African. SOEs reported 81% African employment, whilst SMEs reported 92% African 
employment.  
• Sautman and Hairong (2015) argues that across 400 Chinese enterprises and projects in 
over 40 African countries, more than 80% of workers are local: this finding is drawn from 
their database on workforce localisation.  
• Wang and Zadek (2016) surveyed a number of studies showing local employment, 
including a 2013 member survey by the China International Contractors Association that 
found the local employment rate in Africa was 70%. The Ethiopia light railway by CGC 
Overseas Construction Group is predicted to employ 300 Chinese workers and more 
than 5,000 local workers (Wang & Zadek, 2016). 
• In Kenya, the construction of the SGR required China Road and Bridge Corporation to 
employ 40% local staff – as such, it was expected to create 30,000 direct jobs for 
Kenyans and 13,000 indirect jobs (largely through local companies supplying materials 
and services (Wang & Zadek, 2016). However, these jobs are potentially short-term, as a 
Chinese company has been awarded the contract to run the railway for the first five 
years.  
• Sinkala and Zhou’s (2014) study into Chinese FDI and employment creation in Zambia 
uses secondary data obtained from the Zambia Development Agency and finds that over 
10,000 jobs were created for Zambians. 
• Surveys of Chinese companies in Mozambique, Kenya and Uganda in 2015 reported 
local job creation (Weng & Buckely, 2016).  
• Shen’s (2013) survey of government officials in five countries (Liberia, Ethiopia, Rwanda, 
Nigeria and Zambia) found that there was a perception that Chinese investment in labour 
intensive sectors led to job creation. 
A four-year SOAS research project examining employment patterns and outcomes in the 
infrastructure construction (specifically road infrastructure) and manufacturing sectors in Angola 
and Ethiopia found that Chinese firms do create local employment (Oya & Schaefer, 2019). In 
Ethiopia, 90% of all workers were local nationals, and in Angola an estimated 74% were local 
nationals (Oya & Schaefer, 2019). Skill shortages in Angola may be one reason why the rate is 
lower than for Ethiopia (Oya & Schaefer, 2019). 
In contrast, a 2017 Working Paper by the German Institute of Global and Area Studies finds that 
proximity to Chinese-operated mines is associated with unemployment. Wegenast et al. (2017) 
combine a dataset of mining control rights between 1997 and 2015 for 21 sub-Saharan African 
countries, with geocoded data from three rounds of the Afrobarometer survey which includes 
information on employment status and access to infrastructure (defined as piped water and 
access to paved/tared roads). The robustness of the findings is tested by performing multilevel 
mixed-effects models using district-level data from the Demographic Health Survey. Wegenast et 
al. (2017) find that proximity to Chinese-operated mines is associated with unemployment, but 
populations living closer to Chinese mining areas enjoy better infrastructure. Comparison with 
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non-Chinese controlled mines shows that proximity to a non-Chinese controlled mine significantly 
reduces the risk of unemployment, but has lower effects of access to infrastructure outcomes 
(Wegenast et al., 2017). 
Job roles: There is some evidence that the proportions of local employment are lower for 
managers and skilled positions, although there are also variations across countries and sectors, 
suggesting a more nuanced picture (Suatman & Hairong, 2015; Oya & Schaefer, 2019). For 
example, Sun et al.’s (2017) survey found that only 33% of managers in the construction sector 
were African. In contrast, firm level surveys conducted by Oya and Schaefer (2019) found that in 
Ethiopia, Chinese construction firms hire local managers for middle-management positions. 
However, this was much rarer in Angola.  
The workforce in many Chinese firms in the construction and manufacturing sectors in Angola 
are largely poorer migrant workers with lower education levels and less relevant sector work 
experience (Oya & Schaefer, 2019). In contrast, a relatively higher-skilled segment of workers, 
with education levels above the average urban worker and more sector work experience, were 
found in Angolan and other foreign firms (Oya & Schaefer, 2019)12. However, Oya and Schaefer 
(2019) argue that these segments represent the different employment dynamics of Chinese firms 
that entered the Angolan market approximately 10 years ago, in contrast to Angolan and other 
foreign firms that have a more consolidated position. In Ethiopia, the workforce in Chinese firms 
is similar to that in other foreign firms (Oya & Schaefer, 2019). Take-home wages were broadly 
similar in Chinese firms sampled by Oya and Schaefer (2019) to those in other top firms in the 
same sectors, once other worker and company characteristics are taken into account, in both 
Ethiopia and Angola.  
There is a lack of transparency around official job creation claims. For example, China Railway 
Construction Company said it employed 100,000 Angolans on reconstruction of the Benguela 
Railway and trained 10,000 as railway technicians – however, there is no hard data available to 
verify this claim (Duarte et al., 2015).  
Contribution to skills and training: Wang and Zadek (2016) argue that whilst it is recognised 
that Chinese enterprises hire local people, the focus of the debate should be more on job roles 
held by local workers and opportunities for training and advancement. Sun et al.’s (2017) survey 
found that 53% of Chinese construction companies offer apprenticeships and there is a focus on 
skills training because of substandard vocational training in Africa. In Ethiopia, training is 
widespread in the manufacturing sector and is considered necessary by firms (Oya & Schaefer, 
2019). Chinese firms contribute to skills and training in Ethiopia as much as other firms in the 
same sector (Oya & Schaefer, 2019).  
ICT companies Huawei and ZTE engage in technology transfer through establishing training 
centres in host countries (including a ZTE one in Ethiopia) and developing joint training 
programmes with universities and national telecom countries (Wang & Zadek, 2016). One study 
cited by Wang and Zadek (2016) estimates that Huawei has trained 12,000 African engineers 
and workers a year since 1997; hired 65% of its total staff from Africa; and created over 10,000 
 
12 Oya and Schaefer (2019) is one of the only studies that could be found that compares Chinese labour 
practices in Africa with those of other foreign firms.  
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jobs indirectly. The same 2011 study estimates Sinihydro has trained 8,200 local workers in its 
30 projects in Angola (Wang & Zadek, 2016). 
What Can We Conclude?  
Chinese-funded projects and investments do lead to employment for Africans. However, 
skilled positions are more likely to be occupied by Chinese workers. A relatively good-sized 
body of literature examines the local employment impacts of Chinese investment, with some 
studies testing the assertion by analysing official figures or by synthesising existing country 
studies. Findings across the evidence base are largely consistent: Chinese-funded projects and 
investments employ a large proportion of Africans (estimates vary from 75% to 89%). Wegenast 
et al.’s (2017) study finds that proximity to a Chinese-owned mine across 21 sub-Saharan African 
countries is correlated with unemployment. This is an aggregate finding and it could be that it 
varies across countries. For example, case study evidence from Zambian mines argues that the 
majority of workers are Zambian, not Chinese (see for example, Sautman & Hairong, 2014). The 
body of evidence suggests that skilled positions are more likely to be occupied by Chinese 
workers, but there are variations across sectors and countries. Skills training and technology 
transfer are growing areas of interest for Chinese companies operating in Africa.  
It is important to note that few studies compare the employment practices of Chinese 
companies with those of other foreign companies operating in Africa or domestic 
companies. Oya and Schaefer’s (2019) study compares the working conditions of Chinese firms 
in Ethiopia and Angola with domestic firms and other foreign firms in terms of labour force 
segmentation, take-home wages and training. Overall, Oya and Schaefer (2019) argue that the 
national, sector and economic context are more important in understanding labour conditions in 
Africa than the country origin of the firm itself. More research is needed into how Chinese 
companies’ practices compare to those of other foreign companies and the variation across 
countries in Africa and sectors.  
Claims of Workers’ Rights Violations, Abuse and Unsafe Practices 
The 2017 McKinsey report argues that instances of unfair or unsafe business practices, 
particularly in resource extraction, that threaten worker safety as well as the environment are the 
most troubling aspect of Chinese investment impacts (Sun et al., 2017). African labour and civil 
society organisations as well journalists and academics have raised concerns about poor worker 
safety standards, low wages, violations of host country labour and environmental laws and 
authoritarian managerial practices (Zeleza, 2014).  
The mining sector is a particular area of concern. For example, Ojakorotu and Kamidza’s (2018) 
peer reviewed journal article examining the relationship between China and Zimbabwe draws on 
secondary sources to outline claims of worker abuses by Chinese companies, particularly in the 
diamond mines, including the absence of protective clothing and physical abuse. Elcoate (2018) 
argues that in the case of Zambian mines, criticism of China is apt.  
Chinese mineral companies are concentrated in four countries – Zambia, Zimbabwe, South 
Africa and the DRC – but there are negative views of Chinese employers in various countries’ 
resource sectors (Wegenast et al., 2017). There have been protests in Chad, Namibia and Niger 
over bad payment and poor working conditions at Chinese-operated mines; accusations of illegal 
safety practices, hostility to trade unions and dangerously long shifts in Zambia; and the alleged 
loss of jobs to Chinese employees leading to protests in Nigeria, Namibia and Zambia 
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(Wegenast et al., 2017). There is a belief that Chinese companies violate labour and 
environmental standards more than other mining operations (Wegenast et al., 2017). The media 
and NGOs regularly point to widespread wage-related grievances among local employees of 
Chinese mining facilities in sub-Saharan Africa (Wegenast et al., 2017).  
Claims of poor wages and violations of labour laws exist in other sectors as well. For example, 
Tyitende’s (2016) commentary on Chinese involvement in the Namibian construction sector 
highlights claims that Chinese companies do not pay national minimum wage and do not provide 
employees with protective clothing: however, it highlights that Namibian companies also do not 
pay the national minimum wage. 
What Does the Evidence Tell Us?  
Considerable literature identifies poor employment conditions that fail to meet domestic and 
international standards, with the most citied example being the mines in Zambia (Wang & Zadek, 
2016). There is a good-sized body of literature case studying Chinese labour practices and 
protests in the Zambian mining sector, which outlines bad and unsafe labour practices (see for 
example, Leslie, 2016; Human Rights Watch, 2011). However, Strange et al. (2013) argues there 
is a lack of statistical evidence to corroborate allegations of poor Chinese labour practices on a 
wider scale.  
Chinese-Owned/Operated Mines in Zambia 
China’s involvement in Zambia’s mining sector includes both SOEs, such as the China Non-
Ferrous Metals Mining Corporation, and privately-owned companies, who do not have a parent 
company in China. Sautman and Hairong’s (2014) case study of the privately-owned Collum 
Coal Mine draws on documentary sources and interviews with union leaders, workers and 
officials in Zambia from 2011-2013 (Sautman & Hairong, 2014). It outlines poor working 
conditions, low wages and allegations of management beating miners, as well as disputes 
between workers and management, including strikes in 2008 and 2009 over pay and conditions 
(Sautman & Hairong, 2014). A shooting at the mine in 2010, where Chinese supervisors shot and 
wounded 13 Zambian protesters, received international attention (Sautman & Hairong, 2014).  
A 2011 Human Rights Watch report into four Zambian copper mines, run by subsidiaries of 
China Non-Ferrous Metals Mining Corporation (CNMC), draws on three field missions and over 
170 interviews, including 95 with workers from Chinese-run mines and 48 with workers from 
other multinational companies’ mines, in order to allow comparison. The report identified a 
number of practices that violated Zambian labour laws and international labour standards, 
including:  
• Poor health and safety conditions (e.g. not replacing damaged personal protective 
equipment, inadequate ventilation and threats to fire workers who refused to work in 
unsafe places underground). 
• Excessive working hours (12- or 18-hour shifts, which workers claim contribute to 
accidents).  
• Anti-union activities (including threats and intimidation to stop workers from joining the 
union of their choice; docked pay; and unrenewed contracts for outspoken union reps). 
21 
These findings are consistent with other case studies, such as Leslie (2016), that also identify a 
number of problems in the mining sector, including accidents and explosions, poor wages and 
violations of labour laws resulting in strikes and protests. 
The role of the Zambian government has also been assessed in terms of its enforcement of the 
regulatory environment (see for example, Human Rights Watch, 2011). Leslie (2016) outlines 
that Zambia has taken some steps to ensure Chinese companies comply with laws, including 
inspections and suspending licenses. For example, the Collum Coal Mine license was 
suspended in 2006 and 2010 for health and safety violations and revoked in 2013 following an 
accident in which one miner died and another was injured (Sautman & Hairong, 2014). The 
government is also taking steps to limit casualisation (the practice of hiring workers on short-term 
contracts to avoid providing statutory benefits) in the mining sector – this has been a problem in 
Chinese-operated mines (Dynamic, 2015). A 2009 study shows strong unions were able to 
convert casual jobs into permanent ones at a Chinese company in Zambia that manufactures 
explosives (Wang & Zadek, 2016).  
Comparative studies are rare, and those identified by Wang and Zadek (2016) suggest 
contradictory findings. For example, a comparative study of Chinese companies and their 
counterparts from OECD countries concludes that there are no substantial differences related to 
working conditions between Chinese companies and those from other countries (Wang & Zadek, 
2016). However, some grey and academic literature found evidence that Chinese companies pay 
lower wages than local and foreign companies and often break regulations (Wang & Zadek, 
2016). In the case of Zambia, a 2009 study found Chinese copper mines paid workers 30% less 
that other copper mines (Wang & Zadek, 2016). Sautman and Hairong (2014) argue that the pay 
gap represents differences in size and profitability, but the gap narrowing and Chinese-owned 
copper mines have similar safety records to larger mines owned by Western-based firms. In 
contrast, Human Rights Watch (2011) argue that Chinese practices fail to meet the standards of 
their competitors in the Zambia’s copper industry. For example, eight-hour shifts are standard at 
mines run by other multinational companies, in line with Zambia’s 48-hour working week.  
Trade Union Involvement 
Isaksson and Kotsadam’s (2018) quantitative analysis of the link between Chinese investment 
and trade union involvement found that Chinese development projects discourage trade union 
involvement in the local area. There is correlation between increasing Chinese aid and 
decreasing trade union involvement, as opposed to World Bank-funded projects, which do not 
affect trade union involvement (Isaksson & Kotsadam, 2018).  
Isaksson and Kotsadam (2018) matched georeferenced data on the subnational allocation of 
Chinese development projects in 18 African countries between 2000 and 2012 with 41,902 
survey respondents from rounds two and three of the Afrobarometer. The authors compared the 
trade union involvement of individuals living near a site where a Chinese project is being 
implemented to those where one will appear in the future, but implementation had not started at 
the time of the survey (Isaksson & Kotsadam, 2018). The results indicate that lower unionisation 
rates near ongoing, as compared to future, Chinese project sites stem from direct measures to 
discourage union involvement (Isaksson & Kotsadam, 2018). The relatively wide geographic 
reach of the observed effect suggests that restrictions in union rights at Chinese project sites 
affects union rights at other companies in the area (Isaksson & Kotsadam, 2018).  
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Oya and Schaefer’s (2019) study of Ethiopia and Angola found differences between the two 
countries, sectors, and the country of a firm’s origin, with regards to the presence of trade unions. 
In Angola, there is a large difference between the presence of trade unions in Chinese 
companies (less than 10%) compared to Angolan and other foreign companies (just over 40%) 
according to firm level survey data (Oya & Schaefer, 2019). In contrast, in Ethiopia there is a 
greater prevalence of trade unions among Ethiopian companies than amongst Chinese and other 
foreign companies (Oya & Schaefer, 2019).  
What Can We Conclude? 
The evidence base suggests that poor labour practices by Chinese-owned companies are 
common in the resource extraction sector. However, the comparative evidence base is small, 
which makes it harder to determine whether Chinese-owned companies have worse 
practices than or similar practices to their non-Chinese competitors. There is evidence from 
Zambian mines that Chinese-owned company practices are worse than those at non-Chinese-
owned mines.  
Isaksson and Kotsadam’s (2018) study finds that unionisation is lower in areas in proximity 
to Chinese projects and that this has spill-over effects to proximate non-Chinese companies. 
There is a wealth of anecdotal evidence that supports this claim. Oya and Schaefer’s (2019) 
study, which includes firm-level survey data and interviews with trade unionists and workers, 
suggest that unionisation rates are affected by the sector and country in which a firm operates. 
However, in both Ethiopia and Angola, unionisation was lower in Chinese companies than in 
national companies (Oya & Schaefer, 2019). It is not possible to draw a robust conclusion on 
unionisation on the basis of two studies.  
6. Environmental and Social Issues 
Chinese environmental practices in Africa have been widely criticised, particularly by the 
environmental advocacy community, on the grounds that China finances and constructs projects 
with weak environmental standards (Shinn, 2016). Chinese extractive companies have been 
sanctioned by host countries for poor practices. For example, Sinopec were accused of illegally 
prospecting for oil in Gabon’s Loango National Park in 2006, and in 2013 the Chadian 
government suspended China National Petroleum Corporation’s license for oil exploration on 
environmental grounds (Xiaoyang & Sun, 2016). However, BenYishay et al. (2016) argue that 
there is no systematic evidence that confronts the causal claim that Chinese-funded 
development projects have negative environmental impacts. 
Large infrastructure projects, including hydropower dams and transportation projects, entail 
resettlement of affected communities and compensation. They also raise issues related to 
environmental damage to the livelihoods of African host communities (Wissenbach & Wang, 
2017). Whilst no academic or grey literature could be located during the timeframe that 
specifically focused on resettlement, working papers, policy briefs and research briefs by centres 
including the China Africa Research Initiative outline resettlement issues in a number of 
infrastructure projects. For example, land compensation has been controversial in the case of the 
Mombasa-Nairobi SGR (Wissenbach & Wang, 2017). Land is a sensitive issue in Kenya and 
many communities along the railway line expressed unhappiness with the land compensation 
scheme and the amounts they were awarded (Wissenbach & Wang, 2017). The Kenyan 
government were responsible for the land compensation schemes and there are claims that they 
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do not allocate enough funds for these purposes (Wissenbach & Wang, 2017). Anecdotal 
evidence of resettlement includes the forcible eviction of over 400 families in Kipawa, Tanzania, 
in order to expand Tanzania’s main international airport (a Chinese-funded project) (Yin, 2012).  
Chinese land-related investments have also received increasing attention in recent years, with 
claims of “land-grabs” (Wang & Zadek, 2016). The available academic evidence suggests that 
the scale of this problem is smaller than suggested by the media and there is limited evidence of 
Chinese land grabs (Wang & Zadek, 2016). Bräutigam (2018) argues that the majority of 
Chinese-owned farms in Africa are small, less than 100 hectares. There are Chinese 
agribusiness companies in Africa, but in most cases the amounts of land are smaller than 
reported and the projects are related to commercial, import-substitution production, or biofuels 
(Bräutigam & Zhang, 2013 cited in Wang & Zadek, 2016).  
Chinese Investments and Claims of Environmental Degradation 
China’s investments in Africa are often located in environmentally sensitive areas and much of 
the literature mentions concerns, criticisms and protests about Chinese investments in mining, 
infrastructure, forestry and agricultural projects (Wang & Zadek, 2016). Chinese investment in 
the oil sector in Sudan, South Sudan and Chad, and mining investments in the DRC, have all 
had negative environmental and social consequences including water pollution, resulting in 
livestock deaths and serious illness in affected communities (Shinn, 2016). Chinese companies 
have often negotiated mining concessions in the absence of competitive bidding and 
environmental assessments (Shinn, 2016). Xiaoyang and Sun (2016) and Shinn (2016) outline 
environmental problems in manufacturing (for example, Chinese-owned tanneries in Ethiopia and 
Somaliland which have been responsible for water pollution), extractives (for example, water and 
soil pollution from artisanal mining in Ghana) and construction (there have been cases of 
Chinese firms paying bribes rather than allocating spending for environmental assessment and 
protection). China’s connections to the illegal ivory and rhino horn trade have also received 
international attention (Shinn, 2016). 
Hydropower Projects 
China is the single most important source of funding for and builder of hydropower dams in Africa 
(Shinn, 2016). There is a good-sized body of academic and grey literature examining Chinese 
hydropower development in Africa and its environmental and social impacts, including 
resettlement, flooding protected areas with impacts on wildlife, and reducing communities’ 
access to natural resources.  
Controversial Chinese funded and/or constructed projects include the Merowe Dam, Sudan; the 
Mphanda Nkuwa Dam, Mozambique; the Bui Dam, Ghana; and the Gibe III Dam, Ethiopia 
(Xiaoyang & Sun, 2016; Shinn, 2016). These projects have all been criticised for their 
environmental and social impacts (Shinn, 2016). For example, the Bui Dam in Ghana flouted 
many of the Environmental Impact Assessment’s (EIA) recommendations on consultation with 
local people, health and livelihood security and adequate compensation (Tan-Mullins & Mohan, 
2013). The EIAs for both the Merowe Dam and the Mphanda Nkuwa Dam have been labelled 
inadequate (Shinn, 2016).  
A comparative study of large Chinese-financed hydropower dams in Africa and Asia found that 
Chinese investment is supporting economic growth and development opportunities, especially in 
low-carbon energy generation (Tan-Mullins, Urban, & Mang, 2017). However, there are a number 
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of negative repercussions that are not adequately addressed by financiers, dam builders or 
national governments (Tan-Mullins et al., 2017). For example, the Bui Dam in Ghana has flooded 
part of the national park, home to the black hippo, an endangered species (SOAS, 2015).  
It is worth noting that hydropower dams are controversial regardless of funder. Consequently, 
key to investigating the environmental impacts of Chinese development investment in Africa will 
be distinguishing whether project impacts are because of the “Chinese” nature of the project, or 
because of the nature of the project itself (BenYishay et al., 2016). The World Bank used to be 
the biggest funder of hydropower projects in Africa but has become more selective in the projects 
it funds, due to social and environmental considerations. For example, it suspended funding to 
the Inga 3 dam in DRC due to concerns over the government’s project management 
arrangements (International Rivers, n.d.; Business Day, 2018). A consortium of Chinese SOEs 
and Spanish companies are now preparing a tender for the project following extensive 
negotiations with the government (Business Day, 2018). This example highlights the role of 
African government agency, suggesting that it is not necessarily that Chinese investments have 
inherently bad practices, but that they comply to host government standards, which may be 
weaker than international standards.  
Differential Impacts by Company Size and Type 
There are related claims within the literature that Africa’s relatively weaker environmental 
regulations have attracted firms from higher polluting sectors of China, and that China, which has 
a number of domestic environmental problems, is moving its high-polluting industries to Africa 
(Xiaoyang & Sun, 2016; Shinn, 2016). For example, Hebei Iron & Steel, China’s largest producer, 
is bringing a huge plant in South Africa online, and the Hebei provincial authorities hope to 
relocate large production amounts by 2023 (Shinn, 2016).  
Xiaoyang and Sun (2016) argue that Chinese investments need to be examined more 
systematically in order to see not only whether environmental abuses are occurring, but in which 
sectors and why. Their study is based on interviews and field trips in Beijing and Africa. They 
argue that the level of negative environmental impact varies by industry and company attributes, 
including size and relationship with the Chinese government. Xiaoyang and Sun (2016) argue 
there is a divide between SOEs and small private businesses: the larger companies with capital 
over USD 10 billion (most of which are SOEs) pay more attention to socio-environmental issues, 
whereas smaller, private businesses often evade government control and pursue short-term 
profit at the expense of environmental and social impacts. Reasons for this include: 
• SOEs have long-term horizons, so aim to create investment-friendly environments, as 
opposed to smaller companies which seek short-term profits.  
• SOEs are more closely scrutinised by the authorities and the public, including Chinese 
embassies in the host country, and have internal controls related to socio-environmental 
issues, whereas smaller, private companies are more likely to solve problems on an ad 
hoc basis and are not inside the purview of the Chinese embassies or government 
commercial offices located in Africa (Xiaoyang & Sun, 2016).  
What Can We Conclude? 
Chinese-funded and constructed infrastructure projects and mines commonly have 
negative environmental and social impacts. A lack of comparative studies means it is hard to 
determine whether this is due to the fact that these projects are Chinese-funded or constructed, 
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or because of the nature of the projects themselves. It is possible that Chinese investment has 
become concentrated in sectors that impact the environment, such as hydropower and 
extractives, because China is more willing than other donors to fund or construct projects that 
have poor consideration of environmental and social standards.  
Chinese Investment and Claims of Deforestation 
Media reports have linked Chinese demand for timber with illegal logging and deforestation in 
Africa – for example, in the border area between Senegal and the Gambia (AsiaNews, 2016). 
Between 2000 and 2002, the Thanry Group were fined more than USD 1.3 million for violating 
forestry laws in Cameroon, including logging outside legal boundaries and in unallocated 
concessions (Shinn, 2016). Chinese investment and trade have been labelled a driver of 
deforestation, both in terms of land clearance for infrastructure projects/impacts of infrastructure 
projects and illegal logging and the timber trade (AsiaNews, 2016; Shinn, 2015). For example, 
increased demand from China for timber for Chinese furniture is one of the pressures on Miombo 
forest, which stretches across Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Tanzania (Ekman, Wenbin, 
& Langa, 2013). Mineral prospecting activities by Chinese companies in forested areas in 
Zambia could also have negative impacts (Schoneveld et al., 2014). However, impacts may be 
due to the expansion of mining generally and not Chinese investment specifically, and outcomes 
are also likely to be conditioned by the capacity of the Zambian state to effectively manage and 
plan investment flows and put in place enforceable social and environmental safeguards 
(Schoneveld et al., 2014). 
What Does the Evidence Tell Us?  
A small body of rigorous, evidence-based literature addresses this narrative. BenYishay et al.’s 
(2016) study into the forest loss impacts of Chinese infrastructure projects merges geocoded 
project data from an AidData dataset with satellite images. Tanzania experienced faster rates of 
forest loss in areas near active projects (both infrastructure and social sector projects). However, 
areas under formal protection, i.e. protected areas, experienced little or no deforestation as a 
result of Chinese-funded projects. Consequently, domestic environmental governance and 
ecosystem protection measures play a crucial role in shaping forest cover outcomes (BenYishay 
et al., 2016).  
Ekman et al.’s (2013) study of Chinese trade and investment in the Mozambican timber industry 
draws on field visits and key informant interviews. China is the only export market for 
Mozambican timber and the trade is largely operated by Chinese companies (Ekman et al., 
2013). As Mozambique banned the export of logs in 2007 and Chinese demand centres on logs, 
the authors argue there are strong incentives for exporting timber illegally as logs, and the 
discrepancy in export/import statistics suggests there is a significant amount of illegally-exported 
timber going to China (Ekman et al., 2013). This case study is part of a wider review of Chinese 
forest practices in four countries that found Chinese companies have a tendency to violate local 
laws, including under-reporting export volume and smuggling raw logs (Shinn, 2016).  
China has taken a number of steps in response to criticism of its activities in the forestry sector, 
including new voluntary guidelines in 2009 encouraging Chinese companies to manage, utilise, 
and protect overseas forests and meetings in Beijing with international forestry stakeholders to 
discuss the evidence (Shinn, 2016). 
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What Can We Conclude? 
The evidence suggests that Chinese demand for wood is linked to illegal logging and 
deforestation. The impacts of projects funded by Chinese investment on forest cover loss can 
be minimised by strong host country environmental governance (BenYishay et al., 2016). 
However, the evidence base addressing this narrative is very small, making it difficult to draw a 
robust conclusion.  
Chinese Investments and Environmental and Social Standards 
A key issue raised in the literature is that China imposes lower environmental benchmarks on its 
aid and investment projects than multilaterals or Western companies (Wang & Zadek, 2016). 
Related to this is the narrative that Chinese companies ignore social and environmental impacts 
due to competitiveness and profitability, including gaining a competitive advantage over their 
Western counterparts (Wang & Zadek, 2016; Zeleza, 2014).  
Related to this is the claim that African governments prefer Chinese investments, as the absence 
of aid conditionalities and lower social and environmental safeguards means projects can be 
implemented quicker (BenYishay et al., 2016). This could encourage African countries to “shop” 
their riskiest projects to China in order to ensure they are funded (BenYishay et al., 2016). 
However, BenYishay et al. (2016) argue that the evidence for these claims is limited and that 
debates persist because it has been difficult to subject the claim that Chinese-funded 
development projects cause large-scale environmental damage to rigorous empirical scrutiny.  
What Does the Evidence Tell Us?  
New Environmental Guidelines 
China has become more and more concerned about negative economic and political 
consequences caused by reputational damage due to its firms' poor environmental practices in 
Africa (Xiaoyang & Sun, 2016). NGOs, including WWF, have expressed concern about the 
environmental implications of Chinese investment in Africa and environmental issues began to 
appear on the FOCAC agenda in 2006 (Tan-Mullins & Mohan, 2013; Shinn, 2016). The Chinese 
government, the Chinese policy banks and Chinese business associations have all issued new 
environmental guidelines motivated by reputational concerns, due to the increasing number of 
complaints (Xiaoyang & Sun, 2016; Alves, 2013). 
Government-issued guidelines include:  
• 2007: the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State 
Council (SASAC) issued guidelines to SOEs on corporate social responsibility.  
• 2008: agreement between the Chinese State Environmental Protection Administration 
and the International Finance Corporation to introduce the Equator Principles in China. 
• 2009: the Ministry of Commerce and the State Forestry Administration published a guide 
on Sustainable Overseas Forest Management and Utilisation by Chinese Enterprises. 
• 2013: the Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Environment Protection published the 
Environmental Protection Guide for Outbound Investment and Cooperation, which 
encourages companies to follow local environmental laws, assess the environmental 
risks of projects, minimise impacts on local heritage, comply with international standards 
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and draft procedures for handling emergencies, amongst others (Shinn, 2016, Alves, 
2013; Xiaoyang & Sun, 2016).  
Xiaoyang and Sun (2016) argue that these documents are all guidelines and are not legally-
binding, as the assumption is that Chinese companies will abide by host country laws. However, 
this is problematic as environmental issues have a relatively low policy priority in Africa and 
regulation is not always well established, which has led to some companies exploiting loopholes 
(Xiaoyang & Sun, 2016; Shinn, 2016). For example, Shinn (2016) argues that there is inadequate 
implementation and enforcement in both Ethiopia and Zambia, as well as constraints due to 
human capacity and financial resources.  
China Exim Bank and China Development Bank have adopted many of the same environmental 
safeguards as other major multilateral banks, including ex-ante and ex-post EIAs, project 
reviews, and compliance with host country environmental laws and regulations (BenYisay et al., 
2016). Both banks also encourage Chinese contractors to undertake conservation activities to 
improve conservation outcomes (BenYishay et al., 2016) and are working with international 
counterparts to promote green finance and corporate social responsibility (CSR) (Wang & Zadek, 
2016). The China-Africa Development Fund, created by China in 2007 to promote investment in 
Africa, was one of the first Chinese funds to insist on an environmental assessment for its 
investment projects (Zeleza, 2014). In 2008, China Exim Bank suspended funding for an iron 
mining and infrastructure construction project in Gabon over environmental concerns (Xiaoyang 
& Sun, 2016).  
Chinese business associations, including the China International Contractors Association, and 
the China Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals and Chemical Importers and Exporters, 
have issued guidelines for social responsibility: the latter was developed in collaboration with the 
OECD, DFID, GIZ and Global Witness (Xiaoyang & Sun, 2016; Shinn, 2016). A large number of 
Chinese enterprises are also seeking ISO certification and a small number of companies 
operating in Africa, including Sinopec in 2012, have signed the UN’s Global Compact (Xiaoyang 
& Sun, 2016; Shinn, 2016).  
Environmental concerns have also risen in prominence in the wider Belt and Road Initiative, with 
the Chinese Ministry of Environmental Protection issuing the Guidance Promoting Green Belt 
and Road and the Belt and Road Ecological and Environmental Cooperation Plan (Renwick et 
al., 2018). These follow the 2012 announcement of the Green Credit Guidelines for sustainable 
investment, which have been labelled “one of the most progressive sustainable finance policies 
in the world” by Friends of the Earth (cited in Renwick et al., 2018, p. 12).  
However, it is important to remember that issuing guidelines is not an assurance of compliance 
or implementation. Shinn (2016) argues that until Chinese government-issued guidelines are 
made mandatory with penalties attached, it is unlikely they will change the behaviour of many 
companies. Capacity building of African environmental governance is also needed (Shinn, 2016).  
SOEs Versus Private Companies’ Compliance  
SOEs with close ties to the national government account for 69% of Chinese foreign direct 
investment into Africa, whilst the remain 31% comes from private Chinese investment banks with 
government connections, sovereign funds like the China-Africa Development Fund, Chinese 
provincial and local governments, and small private companies and individual businesses (Shinn, 
2016). There is some agreement within the literature that SOEs are working to improve 
environmental practices, whilst SMEs are resistant to change (Shinn, 2016). For example, a 
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2011 study of oil companies in Chad outlines that China National Petroleum Corporation, in 
response to criticism from home and abroad and keen to improve its reputation and keep access 
to reserves abroad, has paid increasing attention to environmental issues and has established a 
number of environmental protection measures (Wang & Zadek, 2016). Large Chinese companies 
are also paying growing attention to community development projects and there is evidence of 
individual companies building local facilities, donating to local causes, and sponsoring education 
in African countries (Wissenbach & Wang, 2017).  
Weng and Buckley (2016) argue that the close relationship between SOEs and the government 
creates stronger incentives for compliance and that the Chinese government has severely limited 
influence over private businesses. Their discussion paper on the role Chinese policies and 
guidelines play in governing Chinese companies overseas draws on fieldwork in Mozambique, 
Kenya and Uganda in 2015, including a survey and interviews with 58 Chinese personnel 
working for Chinese companies. Findings include low awareness of Chinese policies and 
guidelines (in the construction and mining sector only 17% and 14% respectively reported 
familiarity with the content of sector-specific voluntary guidelines) and companies paying more 
attention to safety and labour policies than those related to social or environmental issues. 
Interviewees from SOEs reported higher levels of awareness and positive perceptions of 
guidelines than privately-owned companies (Weng & Buckley, 2016). Overall, interviewees 
identified host country laws and regulations as the most important factor guiding company 
operations, and interviewees showed high awareness of local environmental regulation 
requirements (Weng & Buckley, 2016). Project proprietor and financier conditions also have a 
critical influence on the operations of Chinese companies, particularly large-scale construction 
projects.  
Tan-Mullins and Mohan’s (2013) empirical study of Chinese SOEs’ corporate environmental 
responsibility in Africa argues that their investment tends to be in environmentally sensitive 
sectors. Following growing pressure at home and abroad, Chinese SOEs are beginning to adopt 
CSR initiatives (Tan-Mullins & Mohan, 2013). However, there is slippage between stated intent 
and actual practice in Africa, with successful CSR limited by the willingness of Chinese SOEs to 
voluntarily abide by codes and the varying local socio-political structures and the composition of 
stakeholders at the local level (Tan-Mullins & Mohan, 2013). The tendency towards 
environmental protection is higher in contexts where non-state stakeholders exist and are 
empowered by legislation (Tan-Mullins & Mohan, 2013). It would be a myth to believe that Beijing 
has complete control over SOEs’ activities abroad, and business imperatives tend to dominate 
operations at the local level (Tan-Mullins & Mohan, 2013).  
Convergence Between Chinese and Western Standards 
Many of the Chinese contractors who implement Chinese-funded infrastructure projects also 
work for the World Bank and others (BenYishay, 2016). Farrell’s (2016) infrastructure quality 
study found environmental and social problems in only two of the 72 contracts analysed. Dollar 
(2016) argues that competitive pressure may therefore push Chinese firms to comply with 
international environmental standards and therefore improve the performance of Chinese-funded 
infrastructure projects. Xiaoyang and Sun (2016) argue that full convergence is unlikely, as the 
Chinese government has a different view to Western governments on the relationship between 
environment and development, but the Chinese government is willing to accept some 
international standards on environmental issues.  
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What Can We Conclude? 
The Chinese government and Chinese companies are responding to the criticisms 
levelled against them by increasing CSR (Wang & Zadek, 2016; Zeleza, 2014; Shinn, 2016). 
There is some evidence that China is increasingly assessing the performance of its investments 
in terms of the sustainable development framework and is sensitive to criticisms of the impact of 
its investments. However, new guidelines are not mandatory, which may impact whether or not 
Chinese companies adhere to them. It is important to distinguish between types of Chinese 
companies. SOEs are regulated by China’s Ministry of Commerce (Sautman & Hairong, 2014). 
Consequently, the government and actors such as the China Exim Bank are able to influence 
them more than privately owned companies.  
7. References 
Alves, A. C. (2013). China's ‘win-win’ cooperation: Unpacking the impact of infrastructure-for-
resources deals in Africa. South African Journal of International Affairs, 20(2), 207-226. 
doi:10.1080/10220461.2013.811337   
AsiaNews. (2016, May 27). China plundering the last forests of Senegal. AsiaNews. Retrieved 
from http://www.asianews.it/en.html  
Balambaras. (2014, August 7). Poorly constructed Addis Ababa roads falling apart. TesfaNews. 
Retrieved from https://www.tesfanews.net/  
Bénazéraf, D. (2014). The Construction by Chinese Players of Roads and Housing in Nairobi. 
China Perspectives, 2014/1, 51-59. doi:10.4000/chinaperspectives.6392  
BenYishay, A., Parks, B., Runfola, D., & Trichler, R. (2016). Forest cover impacts of Chinese 
development projects in ecologically sensitive areas (Working Paper 32). Williamsburg, 
VA: AidData. Retrieved from 
http://docs.aiddata.org/ad4/files/wps32_forest_cover_impacts_of_chinese_development_
projects.pdf 
Bluhm, R., Dreher, A., Fuchs, A., Parks, B., Strange, A., & Tierney, M. (2018). Connective 
financing: Chinese infrastructure projects and the diffusion of economic activity in 
developing countries (Working Paper 64). Williamsburg, VA: AidData. Retrieved from 
http://docs.aiddata.org/ad4/pdfs/WPS64_Connective_Financing_Chinese_Infrastructure_
Projects_and_the_Diffusion_of_Economic_Activity_in_Developing_Countries.pdf 
Bradsher, K. (2019, January 22). China proceeds with Belt and Road push, but does it more 
quietly. The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/  
Bräutigam, D. (2018, April 12). US politicians get China in Africa all wrong. The Washington Post. 
Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/  
Brautigam, D., & Hwang, J. (2016). Eastern promises: New data on Chinese loans in Africa, 
2000-2014 (Working Paper 2016/4). Washington, DC: China-Africa Research Initiative, 
School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. Retrieved from 
https://foreignpolicy.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/96909-easternpromisesv4.pdf 
30 
Business Day. (2018, October 22). DRC sets deadline for multibillion-dollar Inga 3 hydropower 
plant proposals. Business Day. Retrieved from https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/  
China Power Team. (2016, February 15). How are global views on China trending? China Power. 
Retrieved from https://chinapower.csis.org/  
Dahir, A. L. (2018, November 28). Tanzania’s president praised Beijing’s ‘condition-free’ aid – 
after opening a China-built library. Quartz Africa. Retrieved from https://qz.com/africa/  
Dollar, D. (2016). China’s engagement with Africa: From natural resources to human resources. 
Washington, DC: The John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings. Retrieved from 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Chinas-Engagement-with-Africa-
David-Dollar-July-2016.pdf  
Donou-Adonsou, F., & Lim, S. (2018). On the importance of Chinese investment in Africa. 
Review of Development Finance, 8(1), 63-73. doi:10.1016/j.rdf.2018.05.003 
Dreher, A., Fuchs, A., Parks, B., Strange, A., & Tierney, M. (2015). Apples and dragon fruits: The 
determinants of aid and other forms of state financing from China to Africa (Working 
Paper 15). Williamsburg, VA: AidData. Retrieved from 
http://docs.aiddata.org/ad4/files/wps15_apples_and_dragon_fruits.pdf 
Dreher, A., Fuchs, A., Hodler, R., Parks, B., Raschky, P., & Tierney, M. (2016). Aid on demand: 
African leaders and the geography of China’s foreign assistance (Working Paper 3). 
Williamsburg, VA: AidData. Retrieved from http://docs.aiddata.org/ad4/files/inline/wp3_-
_revised_working_paper_series_dreher_et_al_2016_october.pdf  
Dreher, A., Fuchs, A., Parks, B., Strange, A., & Tierney, M. (2017). Aid, China, and growth: 
Evidence from a new global development finance dataset (Working Paper 46). 
Williamsburg, VA: AidData. Retrieved from 
http://docs.aiddata.org/ad4/pdfs/WPS46_Aid_China_and_Growth.pdf 
Duarte, A., Pacheco, F., Santos, R., & Tjonneland, E. (2015). Diversification and development, or 
“white elephants”? Transport in Angola’s Lobito corridor (CMI Report 2015: 7). Bergen: 
Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI). Retrieved from https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/5510-
diversification-and-development-or-white-elephants.pdf  
Duggan, B. (2017, July 4). How did a $12 million bridge collapse in Kenya? CNN. Retrieved from 
https://edition.cnn.com/  
Dynamic, B. (2015). The eradication of casualization in Zambia: Local agency and economic win-
win in Sino-Zambian relations (CCS Commentary). Stellenbosch: Center for Chinese 
Studies, University of Stellenbosch. Retrieved from http://www0.sun.ac.za/ccs/wp-
content/uploads/2015/07/CCS_Commentary_Casualization_Zambia_Beyongo-_2015.pdf  
Ekman, S-M. S., Wenbin, H., & Langa, E. (2013). Chinese trade and investment in the 
Mozambican timber industry: A case study from Cabo Delgado Province (Working Paper 
122). Bogor, Indonesia: Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR). Retrieved 
from http://webdoc.sub.gwdg.de/ebook/serien/yo/CIFOR_WP/122.pdf 
Elcoate, A. (2018, October 5). Mines, money, Mandarin: China in Zambia. The Diplomat. 
Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/  
31 
Eom, J., Hwang, J., Atkins, L., Chen, Y., & Zhou, S. (2017). The United States and China in 
Africa: What does the data say? (Policy Brief 18). Washington, DC: SAIS China-Africa 
Research Initiative, John Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies 
(SAIS). Retrieved from 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5652847de4b033f56d2bdc29/t/58fd32a5ff7c502a4
93d18ed/1492988584819/PB18_US+China+Africa.pdf 
ERA (Executive Research Associates (Pty) Ltd.). (2009). China in Africa: A strategic overview. 
Report on file at The Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade 
Organization. Retrieved from 
https://www.ide.go.jp/library/English/Data/Africa_file/Manualreport/pdf/china_all.pdf 
Freeman, C. W., & Boynton, X. L. (2011). China’s emerging global health and foreign aid 
engagement in Africa. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS). Retrieved from https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/legacy_files/files/publication/111122_Freeman_ChinaEmergingGlobalHealth_Web.
pdf 
Farrell, J. (2016). How do Chinese contractors perform in Africa? Evidence from World Bank 
Projects (Working Paper 3). Washington, DC: China-Africa Research Initiative, John 
Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Retrieved from 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5652847de4b033f56d2bdc29/t/573c970bf8baf359
1b05253f/1463588620386/Working+Paper_Jamie+Farrell.pdf 
Gardner, T. (2018, May 12). In Ethiopia’s bushlands, promised riches of a railway boom turn to 
dust. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/uk  
Golubski, C. (2017, January 27). Africa in the news: Ethiopia-Djibouti railway complete, AU 
summit held, and the Gambia crisis ends. Brookings. Retrieved from 
https://www.brookings.edu/  
Gutman, J., & Zhang, C. (2015, June 24). Who wins World Bank-financed government contracts? 
Four things we learned from the data (+ 1 lingering question). Brookings. Retrieved from 
https://www.brookings.edu/ 
Hanauer, L. & Morris, L. (2014). Chinese Engagement in Africa Drivers, Reactions, and 
Implications for U.S. Policy. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. Retrieved from 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR521.html 
Human Rights Watch. (2011). “You’ll be fired if you refuse”: Labour abuses in Zambia’s Chinese 
state-owned copper mines. New York, NY: Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2011/11/04/youll-be-fired-if-you-refuse/labor-abuses-zambias-
chinese-state-owned-copper-mines  
International Rivers. (n.d.). The Ingo 3 hydropower project. International Rivers. Retrieved from 
https://www.internationalrivers.org/  
Isaksson, A-S., & Kotsadam, A. (2018). Racing to the bottom? Chinese development projects 
and trade union involvement in Africa. World Development, 106, 284-298. 
doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2018.02.003 
32 
Kazeem, Y. (2018). One of Africa’s poorest countries has pulled the plug on a $400 million 
China-funded airport. Quartz Africa. Retrieved from https://qz.com/africa/  
Kim, Y., & Tukic, N. (2018). Tanzanian infrastructure development and the role of China: The 
case of Bagamoyo Port (Policy Briefing). Stellenbosch: Center for Chinese Studies, 
University of Stellenbosch. Retrieved from http://www0.sun.ac.za/ccs/wp-
content/uploads/2018/10/CCS_PB_Tanzania_infrastructure_development_China_2018.p
df  
Kragelund, P., & Carmody, P. (2016). The BRICS’ impacts on local economic development in the 
Global South: The cases of a tourism town and two mining provinces in Zambia. Area 
Development and Policy, 1(2), 218-237. doi:10.1080/23792949.2016.1188665  
Landry, D. G. (2018a). Comparing the determinants of Western and Chinese development 
finance flows to Africa (Working Paper 2018/21). Washington, DC: SAIS China-Africa 
Research Initiative, John Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies 
(SAIS). Retrieved from 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5652847de4b033f56d2bdc29/t/5d3f62c6e190cc00
0131b3cd/1564435143000/WP-21-Development-Finance-David-G-Landry.pdf 
Landry, D. G. (2018b). The risks and rewards of resource-for infrastructure deals: Lessons from 
the Congo’s Sicomines Agreement (Policy Brief No. 22). Washington, DC: SAIS China-
Africa Research Initiative, John Hopkins University School of Advanced International 
Studies (SAIS). Retrieved from 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5652847de4b033f56d2bdc29/t/5afb24e9575d1fe4
c2388206/1526408425497/Brief+22+-+Sicomines+-+Landry+-+Version+3.pdf 
Lekorwe, M., Chingwete, A., Okuru, M., & Samson, R. (2016). China’s growing presence in 
Africa wins largely positive popular reviews (Dispatch No. 122). Afrobarometer Round 6. 
Retrieved from 
http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Dispatches/ab_r6_dispatchno122_
perceptions_of_china_in_africa1.pdf 
Leslie, A. N. (2016). Zambia and China: Workers’ protest, civil society and the role of opposition 
politics in elevating state engagement. African Studies Quarterly, 16(3-4), 89-106. 
Retrieved from http://sites.clas.ufl.edu/africa-asq/files/v16a7.Leslie.AL-HD.pdf 
Li, J., Newenham-Kahindi, A., Shapiro, D. M., & Chen, V. Z. (2013). The two-tier bargaining 
model revisited: Theory and evidence from China’s natural resources investments in 
Africa, Global Strategy Journal, 3, 300-321. doi:10.1111/j.2042-5805.2013.01062.x 
Martorano, B., Metzger, L., & Sanfilippo, M. (2018). Chinese development assistance and 
household welfare in sub-Saharan Africa (Working Paper 50). Williamsburg, VA: AidData. 
Retrieved from 
http://docs.aiddata.org/ad4/pdfs/WPS50_Chinese_Development_Assistance_and_House
hold_Welfare_in_Sub-Saharan_Africa.pdf  
Matsiko, H. (2016, April 25). The truth about Karuma, Isimba mess. The Independent. Retrieved 
from https://www.independent.co.ug/ 
33 
Mellander, C., Lobo, J., Stolarick, K., & Matheson, Z. (2015). Night-time light data: A good proxy 
measure for economic activity? PLoS One, 10(10), [139779]. 
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0139779  
Ndlovu, T. (2014, September 18). China’s African ambitions stumble in Botswana. Aljazeera. 
Retrieved from https://www.aljazeera.com/  
Ojakorotu, V. & Kamidza, R. (2018). Look East Policy: The case of Zimbabwe–China political 
and economic relations since 2000. India Quarterly, 74(1), 17-41. 
doi:10.1177%2F0974928417749642  
d’Orey, M. A. J., & Prizzon, A. (2017). An ‘age of choice’ for infrastructure financing in sub-
Saharan Africa? Evidence from Ethiopia and Kenya. London: Overseas Development 
Institute (ODI). Retrieved from https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-
documents/11456.pdf 
Oya, C. & Schaefer, F. (2019). Chinese firms and employment dynamics in Africa: A comparative 
analysis (IDCEA Research Synthesis Report). London: SOAS, University of London. 
Retrieved from https://www.soas.ac.uk/idcea/publications/reports/file141857.pdf 
Pilling, D. & Feng, E. (2018, December 5). Chinese investments in Africa go off the rails. The 
Financial Times. Retrieved from https://www.ft.com/  
Pilling, D., & Feng, E. (2018, December 11). China dumps ‘vanity projects’ in Africa. Ozy. 
Retrieved from https://www.ozy.com/  
Redvers, L. (2010, July 7). Safety fears for a Chinese built hospital in Angola. BBC World 
Service. Retrieved from 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/africa/2010/07/100707_angolahospital.shtml  
Renwick, N., Gu, J., & Gong, S. (2018). The impact of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) investment 
in infrastructure on achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (K4D Emerging Issues 
Report). Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies. Retrieved from 
https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/20.500.12413/14097/K4D_Emergi
ng_Issue_Report_BRI.pdf?sequence=123&isAllowed=y  
Sautman, B., & Hairong, Y. (2014). Bashing “the Chinese”: contextualizing Zambia’s Collum Coal 
Mine shooting. Journal of Contemporary China, 23(90), 1073-1092.  
doi:10.1080/10670564.2014.898897 
Sautman, B. & Hairong, Y. (2015). Localizing Chinese enterprises in Africa: From myths to 
policies (Thought Leadership Brief 05). Hong Kong: HKUST IEMS. Retrieved from 
https://iems.ust.hk/assets/publications/thought-leadership-
briefs/2015/tlb05/hkust_iems_thought_leadership_brief_tlb05.pdf 
Schoneveld, G., German, L., & Gumbo, D. (2014). The developmental implications of 
Sino-African economic and political relations: A preliminary assessment for the case of 
Zambia (Working Paper 133). Bogor, Indonesia: Center for International Forestry 
Research (CIFOR). Retrieved from 
http://www.cifor.org/publications/pdf_files/WPapers/WP133Schoneveld.pdf 
34 
Shen, X. (2013). Private Chinese investment in Africa: Myths and realities (English) (Policy 
Research Working paper WPS 6311). Washington, DC: World Bank. 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/488211468216585858/Private-Chinese-
investment-in-Africa-myths-and-realities 
Shinn, D. (2015, April 8). The environmental impact of China’s investment in Africa. International 
Policy Digest. Retrieved from https://intpolicydigest.org/  
Shinn, D. (2016). The environmental impact of China's investment in Africa. Cornell International 
Law Journal, 49(1), 25-67. Retrieved from 
https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj/vol49/iss1/2  
Sinkala, M., & Zhou, W. (2014). Chinese FDI and employment creation in Zambia. Journal of 
Economics and Sustainable Development, 5(23), 39-43. Retrieved from 
https://www.iiste.org/Journals/index.php/JEDS/article/viewFile/16755/17107  
SOAS. (2015, November 13). Chinese hydropower investment in Africa and Asia paves way for 
economic boom in LMICs but disproportionately affects the ‘rural poor’ around dam site 
locations, SOAS study finds. SOAS University of London. Retrieved from 
https://www.soas.ac.uk/  
Solomon, S. (2018a, July 13). As China’s investment strategies shift, African partners face risks. 
Voice of America. Retrieved from https://www.voanews.com/   
Solomon, S. (2018b, November 26). Chinese officials arrested for bribery amid Kenya’s SGR 
corruption inquiry. Voice of America. Retrieved from https://www.voanews.com/  
Soule, F. (2019, January 4). How African governments should negotiate better infrastructure 
deals with China. Quartz Africa. Retrieved from https://qz.com/africa/  
Strange, A., Parks, B., Tierney, M., Fuchs, A., Dreher, A., & Ramachandran, V. (2013). China’s 
development finance to Africa: A media-based approach to data collection (Working 
Paper 323). Washington, DC: Center for Global Development. Retrieved from 
http://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/chinese-development-finance-africa.pdf 
Sun, I. Y., Jayaram, K., & Kassiri, O. (2017). Dance of the lions and dragons. How are Africa and 
China engaging, and how will the partnership evolve? (Report). McKinsey & Company. 
Retrieved from 
https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Featured%20Insights/Middle%20East%20
and%20Africa/The%20closest%20look%20yet%20at%20Chinese%20economic%20enga
gement%20in%20Africa/Dance-of-the-lions-and-dragons.ashx 
Tan-Mullins, M., & Mohan, G. (2013). The potential of corporate environmental responsibility of 
Chinese state-owned enterprises in Africa. Environment, Development and Sustainability, 
15(2), 265–284. Retrieved from http://oro.open.ac.uk/35601/2/A44E2AD2.pdf  
Tan-Mullins, M., Urban, F., & Mang, G. (2017). Evaluating the behaviour of Chinese stakeholders 
engaged in large hydropower projects in Asia and Africa. The China Quarterly, 230, 464-
488. doi:10.1017/S0305741016001041  
Tiezzi, S. (2018, September 5). FOCAC 2018: Rebranding China in Africa. The Diplomat. 
Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/  
35 
Tukic, N. (2015). Chinese companies awarded US$ 9 billion to construct railways in Tanzania 
(CSS Commentary). Stellenbosch: Centre for Chinese Studies, University of 
Stellenbosch. Retrieved from http://www0.sun.ac.za/ccs/wp-
content/uploads/2015/06/Commentary_China_Tanzania_Infrastructure_NT_June_2015_
02.pdf  
Tyitende, R. (2016). China in Namibia: An appraisal of the construction industry (CCS 
Commentary). Stellenbosch: Centre for Chinese Studies, University of Stellenbosch. 
Retrieved from http://www0.sun.ac.za/ccs/wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/CCS_Commentary_Construction_Rui_01FEB2016.pdf 
Wang, Y., & Zadek, S. (2016). Sustainability impacts of Chinese outward direct investment: A 
review of the literature (IISD Report). Manitoba, Canada: International Institute for 
Sustainable Development (IISD). Retrieved from 
https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/sustainability-impacts-chinese-
outward-direct-investment-literature-review.pdf 
Wegenast, T., Struver, G., Giesen, J., & Krauser, M. (2017). At Africa’s expense? Disaggregating 
the social impact of Chinese mining operations (GIGA Working Paper 308). Hamburg: 
German Institute of Global and Area Studies. Retrieved from https://www.giga-
hamburg.de/en/system/files/publications/wp308_wegenast-struever-giesen-krauser.pdf 
Weisbrod, A., & Whalley, J. (2011). The contribution of Chinese foreign direct investment to 
Africa’s pre-crisis growth surge (NBER Working Paper 17544). Cambridge, MA: National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). Retrieved from 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w17544  
Weng, X., & Buckley, L. (Eds.) (2016). Chinese businesses in Africa. Perspectives on corporate 
social responsibility and the role of Chinese government policies (IIED Discussion 
Paper). London: IIED. Retrieved from http://pubs.iied.org/17581IIED.html 
Wissenbach, U., & Wang, Y. (2017). African politics meets Chinese engineers: The Chinese-built 
Standard Gauge Railway project in Kenya and East Africa (Working Paper 13). 
Washington, DC: SAIS China-Africa Research Initiative, John Hopkins University School 
of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Retrieved from 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5652847de4b033f56d2bdc29/t/594d739f3e00bed3
7482d4fe/1498248096443/SGR+v4.pdf  
Xiaoyang, T., & Sun, I. Y. (2016). Social responsibility or development responsibility - what is the 
environmental impact of Chinese investments in Africa: What are its drivers, and what 
are the possibilities for action. Cornell International Law Journal, 49(1), 69-100. Retrieved 
from 
https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?public=true&handle=hein.journals/cintl49&div=7&start_
page=69&collection=journals&set_as_cursor=0&men_tab=srchresults 
Xu, J. & Carey, R. (2015). China’s International Development Finance – Past, Present and 
Future (WIDER Working Paper 130/2015), Helsinki: UNU-WIDER. Retrieved from 
https://www.wider.unu.edu/publication/china%E2%80%99s-international-development-
finance 
36 
Yin, B. (2012, March 2). Chinese investment in Tanzania bears bitter fruit. The Guardian. 
Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/uk  
Zeleza, P. T. (2014). The Africa-China relationship: Challenges and opportunities. Canadian 
Journal of African Studies / Revue canadienne des études africaines, 48(1), 145-169. 
doi:10.1080/00083968.2014.946298 
Key Websites 
• China-Africa Research Initiative - http://www.chinaafricarealstory.com/ 
• AIDDATA - https://www.aiddata.org/datasets 
 
